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Ever since Ackerlof has shown the impact of asymmetric information in the market for used
cars in his famous lemons’ market example (Akerlof, 1970), asymmetric information has been a
well-known problem in Economics. It is a fundamental issue that arises in many environments
causing inefficiencies and even market breakdowns. Classical examples include insurance mar-
kets and principal-agent settings. The importance of understanding asymmetric information
was emphasized by the Nobel Prize committee in 2001 when they awarded the Nobel Prize
in Economics to Ackerlof, Spence and Stiglitz “for their analyses of markets with asymmetric
information”. One way to cope with the problem of asymmetric information can be communi-
cation and depending on the particular setup different ways of communication are available.
This dissertation consists of three self-contained papers, each of them analyzing a different
way of communication in an environment with asymmetric information.
In the first chapter, I consider unverifiable communication (“cheap talk”). The players
can transmit information by simple chatting but they cannot prove their announcement. It
depends on the setup whether players have an incentive to share information and whether the
announcements are trustworthy. I analyze a setup in which several players want to provide
a public good together. In this case counter acting incentives are present; players try to
coordinate to provide the public good but they also try to understate their willingness to pay
in order to contribute less. As a further way of communication, I also allow for an independent
party who mediates between the players. It is a known theoretical result that such a mediator
can sometimes improve the results of communication. I determine all equilibrium outcomes
under both ways of communication and compare them to allocations which can be achieved
with other mechanisms.
In the second chapter, I consider a setup in which a player cannot lie about his information.
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He can be vague or say nothing at all but everything he says can be verified. I study a setup
where an agent tries to persuade a principal to take a specific action by revealing information
about the state of the world. At the beginning the state is unknown but the agent can acquire
information. I show how the rules for persuasion (whether the agent can choose what to reveal
or whether he has to reveal all information) affect information acquisition ex ante.
In the third chapter, I study a basic example for asymmetric information; a buyer-seller
setting with private information on the side of the seller which can cause a breakdown of
the market. To solve the problem of this information asymmetry certification might help. A
certifier can observe the quality of a seller and can communicate it to the buyers. However,
the certifier maximizes his own profits. Since he is paid by the sellers, he has an incentive to
please the sellers and not to reveal bad information to buyers. Then, however, the information
of a certifier has no value and as a consequence sellers are not willing to pay a fee for the
certification service. The question is how much a certifier should reveal to please the sellers
but at the same time to add any value to his information. I apply a model of certification to
credit rating agencies. I extend existing results by showing the effect of aggregate uncertainty
about the state of the economy on the rating behavior of an agency.
Chapter 1: Communication and Public Goods
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of communication on the provision of public goods. It studies
a situation where players decide about the provision of a public good themselves; e.g. nego-
tiations between nations or agreements between flat mates sharing an apartment. It is well
known in Economics that, even though everyone profits from a public good, players try to
free ride on the contributions of other players. Additionally, players have private information
about their valuations and this private information causes inefficiencies in the provision of
public goods. As it rarely happens that players buy a public good together without prior dis-
cussion, I include pre-play communication. I consider a voluntary contribution game and add
either direct communication between players (cheap talk) or I allow for the help of a neutral
party; a mediator. Using mechanism design, I compare equilibrium outcomes of the game
with communication to outcomes which can be obtained in any other game. As players are
often able to choose whether to participate or not, I consider mechanisms in which players can
drop out of the mechanism at any point in time. The main result of this chapter is that the
following three sets are equivalent; the equilibrium outcomes with cheap talk, the equilibrium
outcomes with mediated communication and the allocation rules that can be implemented
3with any mechanism in which players can opt out. This yields the conclusions that, first, a
mediator can be replaced by direct communication and, second, that any allocation rule that
can be implemented with a complex game in which players can opt out, can also be imple-
mented with a voluntary contribution game with cheap talk. Besides its simple structure, one
further advantage of the voluntary contribution game with cheap talk is that a designer needs
no information about the distribution of types because the rules of the game are independent
of the distributions. In an extension I derive the ex-ante efficient allocation rules under vol-
untary participation at the interim stage and I show that, in the 2-player-case, in all efficient
allocation rules no player has to pay more than her own valuation. Combining the results
it follows that for two players even if players can drop out only at an interim stage and are
committed afterwards, no budget balanced mechanism can increase efficiency in comparison
to the voluntary contribution game with cheap talk.
Chapter 2: Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation
Chapter 2 is joint work with Mike Felgenhauer. We study a situation in which an agent
tries to persuade a principal to take an action in his favor. However, the optimal decision for
the principal depends on the state of the world which is initially unknown to both players.
The agent can privately run as many experiments as desired to acquire information about
the state and afterwards selectively reveal the results he wants. We assume that the agent
can choose the precision of an experiment but that he cannot manipulate the result. We
compare the persuasion probability in the sender preferred equilibrium in a setup where the
agent observes the outcome privately to a setup in which the principal is able to observe
all signals (public experimentation). Public experimentation is studied in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011). Under private experimentation the agent might search excessively and if he
reveals favorable evidence, this evidence should not be taken at face value. The informational
content depends on the number of experiments, which in turn is influenced by experimentation
costs and the agent’s benefit from persuading the principal. We show that the agent prefers
to run just one experiment with a sufficiently high precision which deters further private
experimentation. In this equilibrium the persuasion probability is lower than in the sender
preferred equilibrium under public experimentation. Consequently, the agent is worse off
under private experimentation. The principal benefits from the agent’s commitment problem
not to run further private experiments and prefers private experimentation. We finally show
that the persuasion probability decreases and the decision quality increases in the stakes of
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the agent. This means that the decision maker profits the more the interested party cares
about a favorable decision because then the interested party has to provide higher quality
information in order to commit not to run several private experiments.
Chapter 3: Crises and Credit Rating Agencies
Chapter 3 is joint work with Andras Niedermayer. This chapter addresses the behavior of
a rating agency in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. The quality of a seller’s bond is
perfectly known to the seller, but unknown to investors. Therefore, a rating agency may serve
as a certifier to transmit information about the quality to the buyers. The contribution of this
chapter is that it combines idiosyncratic with aggregate uncertainty. Aggregate uncertainty
plays a major role in many markets and especially in the light of the recent financial crisis. We
investigate the effect of aggregate uncertainty on incentives to distort ratings. We show that
a profit maximizing rating agency does not reveal all information and chooses a binary rating:
either investment grade or junk bonds. Furthermore, with aggregate uncertainty the cutoff
is not at the socially optimal level. Whether the rating agency has an incentive to be too
lenient (a negative cutoff) or too strict (a positive cutoff) is determined by three moments of
aggregate uncertainty: the mean, the variance and the sum of the third and higher moments.
In a period in which the aggregate expected quality has a large variance and low higher order
moments, the agency is too lenient. In a period with a high mean it is too strict. These
moments can be interpreted as a period before a crisis and it is an empirical question which
effect dominates. We provide two extensions of our main result. First, we outline an empirical
strategy to determine whether the pro-cyclical or the counter-cyclical effect dominates. We
show how the moments of the distribution of aggregate uncertainty can be identified from the
prices of financial derivatives. Second, we extend the model to a setup with risk aversion which
explains why there can be multiple rating categories (i.e. investment grade, and possibly a
second, speculative grade). The reason is that with risk aversion, investors value more precise
information about the quality of an asset to reduce risk. We provide numerical examples to
illustrate that a hybrid model of risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty preserves the key





Communication and Public Goods
2.1 Introduction
Consider a situation in which several players have to decide whether or not to buy an
indivisible public good. Even though every player profits if the good is provided, they try to
avoid paying for the public good themselves and try to free ride on the contributions of other
players. This creates the problem of how to finance a public good. In some cases the public
good is provided by the government or another public authority which is able to force players
to pay for it (e.g. a bridge that is financed through taxes). In those cases, efficient decisions
can be made. However, in many situations such an authority does not exist or no authority
wants to impose a decision on the players. In this paper we focus on those situations and
we analyzes the private provision of public goods. This problem arises in a wide range of
situations, from negotiations between nations to agreements between flat mates sharing an
apartment. In all cases players must decide on the provision of a public good themselves. If
players know each other’s valuations for the public good, they can obtain efficient outcomes.
However, we are interested in the case where players possess private information about their
valuations and this private information is a source of inefficiencies in the private provision of
public goods.1
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we characterize all equilibrium outcomes
with pre-play communication in a voluntary contribution game and show that mediation can
be replaced by one round of cheap talk. Second, we show that the voluntary contribution
1In a setting involving incomplete information, budget balance and voluntary participation, Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990) show that there does not exist any game for the provision of a public good that can
implement ex post efficient allocations in equilibrium. This extends the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) for a buyer/seller setting to the provision of public goods.
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game with cheap talk is a robust mechanism which can implement all allocation rules that
allow for ex-post quitting rights.
We model N players who have to decide whether or not to provide a discrete public good
and how to share the costs. The costs are common knowledge but the individual valuations for
the good are private information and they are independent across players. The agents play a
voluntary contribution game in which the sum of the transfers is equal to the cost if the good
is provided and 0 otherwise. This implies that the game has a balanced budget and that there
is no money burning.2 As it rarely happens that players buy a public good together without
prior discussion, we include pre-play communication before the voluntary contribution game.
First, we consider communication with the help of a mediator. Second, we consider simple
non-verifiable direct communication (cheap talk). While sometimes a mediator might not be
available, in many settings players still have the possibility to talk directly to each other.
As mentioned before, we consider a situation in which no authority decides on the public
good. Therefore, under the private provision of public goods, players are often able to choose
whether to participate or not. We depart from the usual assumptions in mechanism design
and consider mechanisms in which players can drop out of the mechanism at any point in
time. Even at the final stage, where players already know the allocation of a mechanism,
they cannot be forced to participate. This implies that a mechanism needs to ensure that in
equilibrium every player gets a utility of at least zero. Furthermore, when a player decides
which type to announce, she already takes into account that she can drop out if she does not
like the result. This changes her incentives to reveal her true type. If all players reveal their
true type even though they can drop out at the end, a mechanism is called veto incentive
compatible.
The main result of this paper is that all three sets of allocation rules are identical: (i) equi-
librium outcomes with cheap talk, (ii) equilibrium outcomes with mediated communication
and (iii) allocation rules that can be implemented with any mechanism in which players can
opt out. This implies, first, that mediation can be replaced by cheap talk and, second, that
any allocation rule that can be implemented with any mechanism in which players can opt
out, can also be implemented with a voluntary contribution game with cheap talk. It follows
that the voluntary contribution game with cheap talk is a robust mechanism with respect to
2Different definitions of a voluntary contribution game exist in the literature. Some papers, alternatively,
assume that contributions are lost if the good is not provided and/or if the sum is larger than the costs. The
definition of a voluntary contribution game in our paper is close to what some papers call a subscription
game.
9the distribution of types. Even though players have private information about their own val-
uation, the mechanism designer needs no information about the distribution of types because
the game does not need to be adapted to the distributions.
We derive and present the result in three steps. First, we show that equilibrium outcomes
with mediated communication are a subset of allocation rules in which players can drop
out. Second, we show that all these allocation rules in which players can drop out can be
implemented by the voluntary contribution game with cheap talk. Therefore, in our setting the
equilibrium outcomes with mediated communication are a subset of the equilibrium outcomes
with cheap talk. Third, we combine this finding with the general result that equilibrium
outcomes with cheap talk are a subset of the ones with mediation. Together this implies the
equivalence of the three sets.
One important insight to understand the intuition of the result is that in a voluntary contri-
bution game all allocations that a mediator implements are Nash equilibria of the stage game
under complete information. Therefore, players are willing to implement these allocations in
the game once they know each other’s valuations. Direct communication is relevant in two
different ways. First, given that there are multiple stage game Nash equilibria for a voluntary
contribution game under complete information, communication can serve to coordinate on
one equilibrium.3 Second, under incomplete information we show that there exist equilibria
in which it is incentive compatible for players to actually reveal their true valuation. Regard-
ing the equivalence with allocation rules in which players can opt out, it is important that,
given the rules of the game, no player has an incentive to bid more than her true valuation.
In this way, a player never has to pay more than her valuation and always has a utility of at
least 0 independent of her announcement. Thus, a player would never use an option to drop
out after any message in the mediated or unmediated communication game. It follows that all
equilibrium outcomes are not only incentive compatibility but also veto incentive compatible.
Since veto incentive compatibility is not a generally known incentive constraint and since
it is not obvious to check whether an allocation rule satisfies this constraint, we provide
sufficient conditions to replace veto incentive compatibility by the more common interim
incentive compatibility. Consider allocation rules that are incentive compatible and in addition
deterministic, ex post individually rational and satisfy a monotonicity condition. We find that,
if an allocation rule is a convex combination of those allocation rules, it is also veto incentive
3The proof contains a technical contribution. We show how cheap talk can be used to create a lottery
(multidimensional random variable) with arbitrary distribution.
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compatible and therefore it is an equilibrium outcome of the voluntary contribution game
with communication.
Mechanism design often analyzes mechanisms that satisfy voluntary participation at the
interim stage (interim individual rationality). Not all of these allocation rules are contained
in the class of veto incentive compatible allocation rules. However, we are interested in
whether the efficient ones are. In an extension we derive the ex ante efficient allocation
rules under interim individual rationality and we show that, in the 2-player-case, all efficient
allocation rules can be ex post individually rational. In other words, the ex ante efficient
provision rules under ex post individual rationality are identical to the ones under interim
individual rationality which means that ex post individual rationality does not impose any loss
of efficiency in comparison to interim individual rationality. We provide an explicit solution
for the transfer function and show that it is monotone in players’ valuations. Combining
the results we can conclude that for two player any efficient allocation rule is veto incentive
compatible and an equilibrium outcome of a voluntary contribution game with one round of
cheap talk. This implies that even if players can drop out only at an interim stage and are
committed afterwards, no budget balanced mechanism can increase efficiency in comparison
to the voluntary contribution game with cheap talk.
Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature; in particular to those on pre-play
communication and on the provision of public goods.
Connected to the literature on cheap talk, which starts with Crawford and Sobel (1982)
who study cheap talk in a sender-receiver game where only one player has private information,
our work analyzes a setting where not only one side but all players have private information,
send messages and take actions. One paper related to cheap talk in a public good problem
is Agastya et al. (2007). They construct a setting with two players who can contribute to
a joint project. The contributions are sunk costs which gives the players a strong incentive
to coordinate. Focusing on the case in which players have a binary message space, they find
that players send a message whether they are going to contribute to the project or not and
that communication increases efficiency. In our setup, in contrast, the game satisfies budget
balance and we consider mediated and unmediated communication for N players and a rich
message space.
There exist few papers which also analyze both, mediated and unmediated pre-play com-
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munication. In some settings, as we show for the voluntary contribution game, mediation
can be replaced by direct communication. One paper closely related to ours is Matthews
and Postlewaite (1989). They show that for double auctions with one buyer and one seller
equilibrium outcomes with one round of cheap talk are equivalent to equilibrium outcomes
with mediated communication.4 Forges (1999) modifies the double auction for one seller and
several buyers and shows that the equivalence between equilibrium outcomes with mediated
and unmediated communication only holds for private valuations. However, in other settings
even with private valuations mediated communication can have equilibrium outcomes which
are not implementable with cheap talk. An example in which only one player sends messages
is Goltsman et al. (2009). They include mediated communication in the setup of Crawford
and Sobel (1982) and show that depending on the degree of conflict between the parties,
mediated communication might perform better than several rounds of cheap talk. Banks and
Calvert (1992) analyze cheap talk and mediated communication in a battle of the sexes game
with incomplete information where several players can send messages. They find that a medi-
ator may improve efficiency with respect to unmediated communication. Hörner et al. (2011)
consider a model of conflict between two parties which have private information about their
strength in a fight and they show that a mediator can increase the probability of peace with
respect to one round of cheap talk.
These papers, as well as ours, analyze mediated and unmediated communication before a
specific game. However, there is also a strand of literature that provides general conditions
under which the set of equilibrium outcomes with (several rounds of) cheap talk is equivalent
to the set of equilibrium outcomes with a mediator, e.g. Forges (1990), Gerardi (2004) and
Forges and Vida (2013). In our game one round of cheap talk with public messages is sufficient
to replace a mediator for any number of players and this result is not covered by their work.
Furthermore, this paper also relates to the literature in mechanism design on ex post in-
dividual rationality and veto incentive compatibility. The idea how to derive an ex ante effi-
cient outcome in a buyer-seller setting was introduced by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Williams (1987) extends their result by including welfare weights. We apply his approach
to a public good problem. Another paper which is closely related to ours is Gresik (1991).
He shows that for bilateral trade the ex ante efficient allocation is also ex post individually
4They prove that given the realization of all types (ex post) the probability of trade and the expected transfers
are the same. Considering stochastic mechanisms there is a difference between their and our definition of
equilibrium outcomes. However, we show equivalence at the posteriori stage which implies equivalence at
the ex post stage.
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rational and we make use of his method to prove that the same is true for all ex ante efficient
allocation rules in a two player public good problem.
Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) and Forges (1999) use the idea of a veto constraint to de-
termine the relation between mediated an unmediated communication in their setup. Besides
these two papers, Compte and Jehiel (2009) is one of the few papers analyzing mechanisms
with veto constraints. They consider a problem where players bargain over a pie and have
different outside options which are private information and can be correlated. This problem
is equivalent to a public good setting with correlated types in which every player is essential
for the provision of the public good. They prove that even if types are correlated there is
no veto incentive compatible mechanism which is ex post efficient.5 Furthermore, they show
that for two players, symmetric welfare weights and independent, uniformly distributed out-
side options the ex ante efficient allocation satisfies veto incentive compatibility. We extend
this result to asymmetric welfare weights and distributions with monotone hazard rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes all equilibrium outcomes of the game with mediated and unmediated communication
and shows the equivalence result. Section 4 identifies the ex ante efficient allocation rules under
interim individual rationality and budget balance and shows that for two players the efficient
allocation rules are ex post individually rational. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Setup
There are N players. Players must decide whether to provide an indivisible public good or
not. The public good costs c and it is non-excludable. Every player i has private information
about her own valuation vi for the public good. This valuation is distributed according to Fi
with support vi ∈ [0, vi]≡Vi and values are drawn independently. We assume that c > 0 and
max
i
vi < c. This information is common knowledge.
Players are risk-neutral with quasi-linear utility. Denote the transfer of player i by Xi. The
realized utility of player i is pii(vi, Z,Xi) = viZ −Xi with Z being the decision whether the
public good is provided, Z ∈ {0, 1}.
We now define an extensive form game. The game is a voluntary contribution game with
5This result relates to Cremer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) who show that, if types are
correlated, there are incentive compatible mechanisms with voluntary participation at the interim stage
that can implement ex post efficient allocation rules.
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communication ex ante, i.e., it has two stages: first, a communication stage; second, a bidding
stage. We are going to consider either mediated communication or one round of cheap talk
at the communication stage.
Under mediated communication players send privately a message to a “mediator” who then
confidentially recommends a bid to each player. In the bidding phase, all players simultane-
ously submit a bid bi ∈ R+. The rules of the game are that the good is provided if and only
if
∑
bi ≥ c.6 Denote z(b) = 1 if the good is provided and 0 otherwise. We require budget
balance; if the good is provided, transfers must add up to the costs:
∑
xi(bi, b−i) = c; if not∑
xi(bi, b−i) = 0. xi(b) is the transfer of player i depending on the bids of all players. The
cost-sharing rule of the game is exogenously given and satisfies:7
- If
∑
bi ≥ c, the good is provided and the costs are shared according to a sharing rule
x(b) that satisfies (i) that no player pays more than her bid, 0 ≤ xi(b) ≤ bi, and (ii) that the
transfer is weakly increasing in the own bid; if bi > b′i, then xi(bi, b−i) ≥ xi(b′i, b−i) for all b−i.
- If
∑
bi < c, xi(b) = 0 for all i.8








j=1 bj ≥ c
0 otherwise.
However, the cost sharing rule does not need to be symmetric, e.g., for two players one
alternative rule is that, if the good is provided, one player has to pay her bid completely
while the other player only has to pay what is left to cover the costs; xi(bi, bj) = bi and
xj(bi, bj) = c− bi if the good is provided and otherwise both pay 0.
Define the utility of player i in the game as ui(vi, bi, b−i) = viz(bi, b−i) − xi(bi, b−i). The
agent’s strategy specifies for each type which message to send to the mediator, Vi → R,
and how much to bid given the type announced and the recommendation of the mediator,
Vi × R× R→ R+0 .
Under unmediated communication (cheap talk) all players simultaneously send a message
6To simplify notation we drop the index i in the sum over all players
∑
i.
7Jackson and Moulin (1992) allow for the same family of cost-sharing rules. They provide a mechanism that
implements first best allocation rules in an environment where players know each other valuations.
8Assume for simplicity that every player is committed to pay her transfer xi(b) (which is weakly less than
her bid bi). We will show later that every player is willing to pay xi(b) because no player has an incentive
to bid more than her true valuation and thus, xi(b) ≤ vi. The subsequent results also hold if we relax this
assumption and assume that the good is not provided if at least one player refuses to pay xi(b).
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mi ∈ [0, vi] and in addition a number yi ∈ [0, 1], which is used for a jointly controlled lottery.
Both messages are publicly observable. In the bidding phase, all players simultaneously
submit a bid bi ∈ R+ and the rules of the bidding stage are the same as under mediated
communication. The strategy for the agent specifies for each type which message and which
number to send to the other players, Vi → R × [0, 1], and how much to bid given the own
announcement and the announcements of all the other players, Vi × R × [0, 1] × RN−1 ×
[0, 1]N−1 → R+0 .
The Equilibrium concept in both games is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
2.2.2 Definitions
An allocation consists of the decision Z ∈ {0, 1} whether the public good is provided and
a vector of transfers X, where Xi is the payment of player i. An allocation is an element of
{0, 1} × RN .
Let H denote the Borel σ-algebra on {0, 1} × RN and L the set of probability measures
on H. An allocation rule r is a mapping r : V N → L. It determines which allocations are
implemented with positive probability for each vector of private valuations v ≡ (v1, · · · , vN ) ≡
(vi, v−i), v ∈ V N , V N ≡ [0, v1]× · · · × [0, vN ].9
An allocation rule is an equilibrium outcome of the public good game with communication
if there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which, for every v ∈ V N , each allocation has
the same probability as in the allocation rule.
We define p(v) as the probability that the good is provided and t(v) as the expected
transfer given v. In this way we can write the expected utility of player i given her own
valuation and the valuation of the other players as vip(v)− ti(v). Given an allocation rule r,
define the expected utility of player i if she sends a message being type mi as Ui(mi, vi) ≡
Ev−i [vip(mi, v−i)− ti(mi, v−i)].
An allocation rule is posteriori individually rational (PostIR) if viZ −Xi ≥ 0 for all v and
all allocations (Z,X) which are implemented with positive probability (see Forges, 1999).
PostIR ensures that at the very final stage, once the allocation has realized, every player gets





all implemented allocations. The difference to the more common ex post individual rationality
9This encompasses the possibility that an allocation rule randomizes over different allocations, which allows
us to include stochastic mechanisms. For a further discussion whether a stochastic mechanism should be
defined as a transition kernel or whether it should be represented as a deterministic mechanism which
maps into a lottery see Forges (1994).
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constraint is that the ex post stage can still hide a final lottery. Ex post individual rationality
states that vip(v)−ti(v) ≥ 0 for all v and all players i. Thus, PostIR implies ex post individual
rationality but not the other way round.10
An allocation rule is ex post budget balanced (ExpostBB) if for all v the sum of transfers∑
ti(v) is equal to the costs if the public good is provided and 0 otherwise. The idea is that
there are no transfers out of or into the mechanism for all realization of valuations.
An allocation rule is interim incentive compatible (IC) if Ui(vi, vi) ≥ Ui(mi, vi) for allmi, vi.
This means that a player’s expected utility of a truthful report, given that everybody else
reports truthfully as well, is at least as large as her expected utility of announcing any other
type.
For the equilibrium analysis we introduce a further incentive constraint, veto incentive
compatibility (Veto-IC), which can be motivated as follows.11 Consider a mechanism that
delivers a candidate allocation; imagine that players can drop out or reject the proposed
allocation, given some outside option. We normalize the outside option to 0, i.e. that every
player can ensure a utility of 0 if she quits the mechanism. Note that PostIR only implies
that a player’s utility is at least 0 after revealing her type truthfully; not after deviating and
announcing another type.12 Even though the option to opt out might resemble an individual
rationality constraint (it ensures a utility of at least 0 on and off path), it affects the truth-
telling incentive constraint as well as it curtails the ability of the mechanism to “punish” a
player after deviation. Thus, PostIR and IC do not imply Veto-IC.
Example 1: We provide a simple example of an allocation rule that is PostIR and IC but
does not satisfy Veto-IC. There are two players, i ∈ {1, 2}, and each player has two possible
valuations for the public good, vi = 2 or vi = 4. Each type occurs with probability one half.
The provision of the public good costs c = 4. The provision and transfer rule are as follows:
provision rule v2 = 2 v2 = 4
v1 = 2 0 1
v1 = 4 1 1
transfer rule v2 = 2 v2 = 4
v1 = 2 0,0 2,2
v1 = 4 3,1 1,3
It is easy to verify that this allocation rule satisfies PostIR and IC. However, if player 1 is
10PostIR and ex post individual rationality are equivalent if a mechanism is deterministic.
11Veto-IC was defined by Forges (1999). See also the condition IC∗ in Matthews and Postlewaite (1989).
Note that Veto-IC is not equivalent to IC∗, even though the motivation is similar. While players can drop
out at an posteriori stage in an allocation rule that is Veto-IC, using IC∗ players can only ensure a zero
utility at the ex post stage.
12An interpretation of PostIR is that at the end players should not regret participating in the mechanism.
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able to drop out, she prefers to announce type v1 = 4 if she has a true valuation of v1 = 2
and to reject the allocation if player 2 has valuation v2 = 2. Thus, this allocation rule is not
Veto-IC.
For a given allocation rule r, let X˜(mi) be the distribution over transfers given message mi
and let Z˜(mi) be the distribution over the decision Z whether the public good is provided
given mi. Define the expected utility
U∗i (mi, vi) ≡ E[max{0, pii(vi, Z˜(mi), X˜(mi))}]
which is the expected utility of type vi if she announces being typemi and rejects an allocation
in case it leads to a negative utility.
An allocation rule is veto incentive compatible (Veto-IC) if U∗i (vi, vi) ≥ U∗i (mi, vi) for all vi,
mi. In this case every player has an incentive to reveal her true type even though she always
has the option to opt out of the mechanism.
2.3 Game with communication
2.3.1 Mediated communication
First, we consider mediated communication in the communication phase. Define a mediator
as a communication device ϕ : RN → ∆RN that, after receiving messages from all players,
can send messages to all players. This is interpreted as follows: first, each player reports her
type to the mediator and then he recommends an action to each player. Using the generalized
revelation principle by Myerson (1982, 1985) we restrict attention to equilibria in which every
player reveals her type truthfully and follows the recommendation of the mediator.13
The following proposition describes all equilibrium outcomes of the game with mediated
communication.
13The revelation principle states that for any given coordination mechanism ϕ and for any given Bayesian
equilibrium of the induced communication game, there exists a mechanism ϕ′ in which it is incentive
compatible for a player to tell her true type and to obey the recommendation and that every type gets the
same expected utility as in the equilibrium of the original mechanism ϕ.
An intuition for this result is that given any mechanism and equilibrium, the mediator can ask the
players to reveal their true type, infer the messages they would send and compute the messages he would
send to the players. Then he identifies the action the players would take given their true types and the
recommendations. Thus, the mediator can tell the players this action directly and they are willing to obey.
Therefore, we can restrict to communication mechanisms and equilibria in which the players honestly
report their types and follow the recommendation of the mediator.
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Proposition 2.1. Equilibrium outcomes of the mediated communication game satisfy Veto-
IC, ExpostBB and PostIR.
The intuition of the proof is as follows. First, we show that no player has an incentive to bid
more than her true valuation and that she is indifferent between bidding her true valuation
and bidding more only if for all v−i the higher bid leads to the same transfer xi as bidding
her valuation. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome satisfies PostIR. Second, it follows directly
from the rules of the game that all allocation rules must be ExpostBB. In the third part of
the proof we use that, even after lying about her type, it is optimal for a player to bid weakly
less than her true valuation. Thus, in any resulting allocation each player gets a nonnegative
utility and therefore would never use an option to drop out. By incentive compatibility the
expected utility of telling the true type and following the recommendation is weakly larger
than the utility of deviating to any other message or bid. Since the optimal bidding strategy
after any message would never use the possibility to opt out, Veto-IC follows from IC.
2.3.2 Unmediated communication
In this section, we consider non-verifiable face to face communication; one round of cheap
talk. To understand the intuition of the equilibrium analysis it helps to look at the stage game
under complete information first. Assume every player’s valuation is common knowledge and
the game only consists of the bidding phase. There exist two classes of Nash equilibria in
the stage game with complete information which are of particular interest. Fix v ∈ V N . In
the first class all players bid bi = 0. The public good is not provided. This is an equilibrium
because no player can profit by increasing her bid. In the second class fix {xi}Ni=1 such that∑
xi = c and 0 ≤ xi ≤ vi for all i. The bid profile bi = xi for all i is an equilibrium. Every
player pays no more than her valuation. If one player lowers her bid, the good is not provided
any longer. Furthermore, no player has an incentive to increase her bid because her transfer
is weakly increasing in her own bid. Note that every allocation that is ExpostBB and PostIR
is an outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game under complete information.
The following proposition states that Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR are sufficient con-
ditions such that an allocation rule can be implemented as an equilibrium outcomes of the
voluntary contribution game with only one round of cheap talk.
Proposition 2.2. All allocation rules that satisfy Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR are equi-
librium outcomes of the public good game with one round of cheap talk.
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The intuition for this result is the following. We show that there always exists an equi-
librium in which every player reveals her true type and afterwards the players implement
an equilibrium of a stage game with complete information. The announcements yi create a
jointly controlled lottery that serves as a public randomization device. Its realization defines
which stage game equilibrium players should play and the lottery is constructed such that
the probability for each allocation coincides with the probability of the allocation rule. If a
player deviates and reduces her bid, the sum of the bids will be lower than c: the public good
is not provided. In the game, a player can either play according to the equilibrium strategy
or deviate and get a utility of 0 in case she bids lower. Thus, even though a player has a wide
range of deviations, it reduces to a simple choice: follow the equilibrium prescription or to get
0. By definition of Veto-IC, it is optimal for a player to reveal her true type even when she
can drop out and ensure a 0 utility given the selected allocation; hence, it is also incentive
compatible for the players to reveal their true type in the round of cheap talk.
2.3.3 Equivalence
It is immediate that in general the equilibrium outcomes with cheap talk are a subset of
the ones with mediated communication. Instead of sending messages directly to each other








First, we provide an example by Farrell (1983) to illustrate that the set of equilibrium
outcomes with cheap talk can be a strict subset of the ones with mediated communication.
That is a mediator can implement equilibrium outcomes that are not possible with cheap talk.
Example 2: There are two players, every player can be one of two types, A or B, and every
player choose between two possible actions, X or Y . A mediator recommends both players to
play Y if both are type B and otherwise to play X. It is an equilibrium in the game for both
players to reveal their true type and follow the recommendation. Thus, the mediator reveals
the information whether both are type B or not. Such an information structure cannot be
achieved by cheap talk because whether one player reveals her type cannot be conditioned on
the announcement of the other player.14
14A full description of the game is provided in the appendix.
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which implies that the set of equilibrium outcomes with mediated communication is a subset
of the set of equilibrium outcomes with cheap talk. Consequently, combining (2.1) and (2.2),















This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. The following three sets are equivalent:
(i) equilibrium outcomes with one round of cheap talk
(ii) equilibrium outcomes with mediated communication
(iii) allocation rules that satisfy Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR
First, this implies that a mediator can be replaced by a single round of cheap talk. Second,
it follows that also several rounds of cheap talk cannot implement any allocation rule which
cannot be implemented by a single round. Third, there is no other game in which players can
drop out that can implement any other allocation rule as an equilibrium outcome than the
voluntary contribution game with communication.
Note that the set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of the specific cost sharing rule.15
15One question is whether our results carry over to related setups, e.g. effort in teams. The main difference is
that there contributions naturally are sunk costs. First, consider all equilibrium outcomes under mediated
and unmediated communication. All these allocation rules can be implemented by bids which are equal to
the required transfers. Thus, they are not affected by a change in the assumption about sunk costs. The
general result that the equilibria with cheap talk are a subset of the ones with mediated communication
still holds but we do not know whether the sets are identical. Furthermore, equilibrium outcomes do not
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2.3.4 Set of veto incentive compatible allocation rules
We have shown that the set of veto incentive compatible allocation rules is equivalent to the
set of equilibrium outcomes in a voluntary contribution game with mediated and unmediated
communication. Though, Veto-IC is not commonly used and sometimes it is difficult to
see whether an allocation rule satisfies this condition. In this section we provide sufficient
conditions such that we can replace Veto-IC by the well known interim incentive compatibility
(IC). Note that Veto-IC and PostIR imply IC.
We define a monotonicity condition (MON). An allocation rule satisfies MON iff
1. the provision rule is monotone, i.e. p(vi, v−i) is weakly increasing in vi
2. the transfers are monotone, i.e. ti(vi, v−i) is weakly increasing in vi,
3. the transfers satisfy for all {v−i|p(vi, v−i) = 1
⋃
p(v′i, v−i) = 0} that ti(vi, v−i) ≥
max
vk
{ti(v′i, vk)} with vi > v′i.
Since condition (ii) does not consider for a change in the provision rule, condition (iii) ensures
that transfers are high if the provision rule changes from 0 to 1. Note that under ExpostBB for
two players the monotonicity condition MON simplifies to the first two conditions. Further,
an allocation rule is deterministic (DET) if it does not randomize over different allocations
given v; p ∈ {0, 1}, p(v) = z(v) and ti(v) = xi(v).
Proposition 2.4. An allocation rule that satisfies IC, PostIR, DET and MON also satisfies
Veto-IC.
In the proof we show that no player lies about her true valuation if PostIR, DET and
MON are satisfied. The first possible deviation is that a player announces a lower valuation,
because a lower type might have lower expected transfers. However, since the allocation rule
is PostIR, a player never rejects an allocation after announcing a lower type and therefore
Veto-IC follows from IC. The second possible deviation is that a player announces a higher
type. Then the expected transfer increases but also the probability that the good is provided
increases. It is now provided for v−i for which it is not provided if a player announces her
true valuation. If the player does not reject any allocation after announcing a higher type,
Veto-IC follows again from IC. The difficult part is to prove that a player has no incentive to
lie if she rejects some allocations at the end. Using the monotonicity condition MON, we can
have to be PostIR anymore and thus, also the comparison to Veto-IC mechanisms does not apply. In total,
all allocation rules stated in the Proposition are equilibrium outcomes in a game with sunk costs but there
might be additional equilibria in which some contributions are lost.
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prove this by contradiction. We show that if a player with valuation vi profits from telling
mi instead of her true valuation, then a higher type v′i, v
′
i ∈ (vi,mi], profits even more from
announcing mi. However, a player with type mi cannot profit from announcing mi relatively
to announcing her true valuation. This yields the contradiction. The intuition is that by
requiring monotonicity in the transfers, we ensure that the “gained” realization of v−i (where
v−i are relatively low) lead to high transfers for player i. Therefore it does not pay off to
announce a higher type.
In order to relax the condition that an allocation rule needs to be DET, we prove that the
set of Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR allocation rules is convex.
Lemma 2.1. The set of allocation rules that satisfy Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR is convex.
This implies that every convex combination between two allocation rules that satisfy Veto-
IC, ExpostBB and PostIR also satisfies these conditions and therefore belongs to the set of
equilibrium outcomes.
Combining Proposition 2.2, Proposition 2.4 and Lemma 2.1 gives the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Any allocation rule r that is a convex combination of allocation rules that
satisfy IC, PostIR, ExpostBB, DET and MON can be implemented by a public good game with
one round of cheap talk.
2.4 Extension
So far, we have derived the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voluntary contribution game
with mediated and unmediated communication. In this section we use mechanism design to
analyze the efficiency property of these equilibria within the context of public goods.
In the previous section we have shown that all allocation rules that satisfy Veto-IC, Ex-
postBB and PostIR are an equilibrium outcome of the game with communication and we
provided sufficient conditions for an incentive compatible allocation rule to satisfy Veto-IC.
Now we check whether we can relax the posterior participation constraint to a participation
constraint at the interim stage. Define that an allocation rule is interim individual rational
(IntIR) if the expected utility Ui(vi, vi) is nonnegative for all vi. This implies that a player is
willing to participate in a mechanism after she knows her own valuation. It is straight forward
that not all allocation rules that satisfy IntIR also satisfy PostIR.
First, as a benchmark, we identify the efficient mechanism under interim individual ratio-
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nality, incentive compatibility and ex post budget balance. Second, we analyze whether the
ex ante efficient allocation rules under IntIR satisfy PostIR and whether they also satisfy
Veto-IC.
2.4.1 Efficient mechanisms
An ex post efficient allocation rule would provide the public good if the sum of the valuations
is larger than the costs,
∑
vi ≥ c. However, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that there
is no ex post efficient mechanism that satisfies IC, ExpostBB and IntIR.16
We call an allocation rule efficient if it is Pareto-efficient in terms of the players’ ex
ante expected utilities (ex ante efficient). To find the efficient allocation rule, we maxi-
mize the weighted sum of ex ante expected utilities subject to IC, ExpostBB and IntIR.
Using the revelation principle, we focus on direct revelation mechanisms which can be charac-
terized by the function p(v), which is the probability that the good is provided, and the
transfer function t(v), which gives the expected transfer each player has to pay. From
now on we assume that the distributions Fi(vi) satisfy monotone virtual valuations, i.e.,
that vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) is increasing in vi. Define the density f(v) ≡ f1(v1) · · · fN (vN ) and
f−i(v−i) ≡ f1(v1) · · · fi−1(vi−1)fi+1(vi+1)fN (vN ). Simplify notation in the following way:´ v1
0 · · ·
´ vN








0 · · ·
´ vN
0 () dvN · · · dvi+1dvi−1 · · · dv1
≡ ´ () dv−i. That is the integral is over the whole support of v (respectively v−i) if no
bounds of integration are specified. We define the following expected values: player i’s
expected payment ti(vi) =
´
ti(vi, v−i)f−i(v−i)dv−i, the probability of provision pi(vi) =´
p(vi, v−i)f−i(v−i)dv−i given player i has valuation vi and player i’s expected utility if she
reveals her true type Ui(vi) = Ui(vi, vi) = vipi(vi) − ti(vi). Define furthermore qi(vi, αi) =
vi − αi 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) and
Γ(p) =
ˆ (∑(











The first proposition is a variation from Theorem 1 in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
it gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation rule to be IC and IntIR.
16In fact, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that there is no ex post efficient mechanism that satisfies
IC, ex ante budget balance and IntIR. Note that ex ante budget balance is a a weaker condition than
ExpostBB.
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(ii) There exists a transfer function such that the mechanism is incentive compatible and











Among others, Proposition 2.5 shows that an IC and InterIR allocation rule can be described
by a provision rule p(v) and the constraint
∑
Ui(0) = Γ(p). Incentive compatibility and the
provision rule p(v) are sufficient to pin down the expected transfers ti(vi) up to a constant.
This constant is not determined because the mechanism only specifies the sum
∑
Ui(0) and
not the individual Ui(0) for every player. Note that Ui(0) is the expected utility of a player
with the lowest type. Thus, incentive compatibility pins down the expected utility for every
type up to a constant and the constant is the utility of the lowest type.
Among all IntIR and ExpostBB mechanisms, we are interested in the ex ante efficient
mechanisms. The idea of the proof follows Williams (1987) who characterizes the ex ante
efficient allocations in a setting with one buyer and one seller.
Define µi as the welfare weight of player i, with µi ≥ 0, and µmax as the highest welfare






subject to incentive compatibility and constraint (2.4). Before specifying the efficient mecha-
nisms, we show in the following lemma how the value of Ui(0) depends on the welfare weights.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose a mechanism (p,Γ(p)) is an efficient allocation rule. Then Ui(0) = 0
for all players with µi < µmax.
The idea is that
∑
Ui(0) is given by the mechanism but it is not specified how to distribute
it on the individual Ui(0). If all players have equal welfare weights, the ex ante expected
utility does not depend on the split of
∑
Ui(0). However, if welfare weights are unequal,
the ex ante expected utility increases by shifting utility to players with the highest welfare
weights. This shift is limited by IntIR because all players must have Ui(0) ≥ 0.
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Knowing how
∑
Ui(0) is distributed among the individual players, we can determine the
optimal mechanism. For the purpose of the next proposition, we introduce the notation of
allocation rules pα(v) which have the following specific form: p(v) = 1 if
∑
qi(vi, αi) ≥ c and
0 otherwise.

















µmax+λ and λ such that Γ(p
α) = 0 if Γ(pα
∗
) < 0.
Note that the efficient allocation rules are deterministic and monotone in the provision
rule. In comparison to an ex post efficient allocation rule in which p(v) = 1 if
∑
vi ≥ c, the
probability that the public good is provided is lower.
Proposition 2.6 distinguishes between allocation rules in which Γ(p) =
∑
Ui(0) > 0 and
allocation rules in which Γ(p) =
∑
Ui(0) = 0. The following Lemma shows that in some cases
we know that condition Γ(p) = 0 is binding.
Lemma 2.3. If the good is never provided for any N-1 players or if all players have equal
welfare weights, the condition Γ(p) = 0 is binding.
Remember that Ui(0) = 0 for all players if Γ(p) = 0. However, if Γ(p) > 0, Ui(0) > 0 for
at least one player. It follows from Lemma 2.3 that for two players Γ(p) = 0 always binds
because we have assumed that one player cannot provide the public good alone, max
i
vi < c.
2.4.2 Ex post individual rationality for two players
We restrict to two players and efficient allocation rules. It follows from the previous section
that all ex ante efficient allocation rules are deterministic and have a monotone provision rule.
The question is whether there exists a transfer function such that the efficient allocation rule
also satisfies PostIR and the conditions on the transfers required by MON. Since the efficient
allocation rules are deterministic, PostIR is equivalent to ex post individual rationality. To
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relate to our previous results we use the notation of PostIR in this section. The derivation
of the transfer function follows Gresik (1991) who provides a PostIR transfer function in a
bilateral trade setting.
In this section we show that there exists such a transfer function if the distributions of
types have monotone hazard rates.
Proposition 2.7. For any efficient mechanism there exists a transfer function that is MON,
PostIR and ExpostBB if both hazard rates are monotone.
To prove this proposition we state an incentive compatible transfer function in Lemma 2.5
and in Lemma 2.6 and 2.7 we show that it is PostIR and monotone if both hazard rates are
monotone. Combining Corollary 2.1 with Proposition 2.7 we get the following result.
Corollary 2.2. For two players any ex ante efficient allocation rule can be implemented by
a public good game with one round of cheap talk if the hazard rates are monotone.
To show Proposition 2.7 define v∗j (vi) as the smallest valuation of player j for which the
good is provided if player i has valuation vi. This means that qi(vi) + qj(v∗j ) = c.
17 Define
v∗i (vj) analogously. Assume that v
∗
i (vj) is differentiable and that
∂v∗j (vi)
∂vi





Note that v∗i (v
∗
j (vi)) = vi and that v
∗
i (vj) depends on the allocation rule and consequently on
the welfare weights. Even though welfare weights will not appear explicitly in the analysis,
the results hold for all weights because they are already incorporated in the provision rule.
Knowing that Γ(p) = 0 for all welfare weights leads to Ui(0) = 0 for both players and together
with the provision rule the expected transfer ti(vi) is pinned down and we can write them in
the following way.




v∗i (vj)fj(vj)dvj . (2.6)
The expected transfer of player j can be derived in the same way and written as tj(vj) =´ vi
vi=v∗i (vj)
v∗j (vi)fi(vi)dvi. Budget balance requires that ti(vivj) + tj(vi, vj) = c if the good is
provided and 0 otherwise. Since we are looking for a transfer function that is PostIR, we set
ti(v) = tj(v) = 0 if the good is not provided. Together with budget balance this implies that
17 Since we restrict to efficient allocation rules, we simplify notation and drop α∗ in qi (vi, α∗).
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tj(vj) also has to satisfy tj(vj) =
´ vi
vi=v∗i (vj)






(c− ti(vi, vj))fi(vi)dvi. (2.7)
Define the following variables:








• θ2(vj) = g(vj)fj(vj)(1−Fi(v∗i (vj)))(1−Fj(vj))2∂v∗i (vj)/∂vj
First, we show that there actually exists a transfer function that is incentive compatible if we
require that the transfers are 0 if the good is not provided.
Lemma 2.5. There exists an incentive compatible transfer function in which payments are
only made if the good is provided
ti(vi, vj) =











c− ti(vi, vj) if p = 1
0 otherwise.
Note that this transfer function fulfills ex post budget balance. To find this transfer function
we assume that ti(vi, vj) is additively separable, ti(vi, vj) = φ(vi) + γ(vj), and then we derive
a solution such that this function integrates to the expected transfers given in (2.6) and





j (t))dt and γ(vj) =
− ´ vit=v∗i (vj) θ2(v∗j (t))dt + v∗i (vj) −
g(vj)
(1−Fi(v∗i (vj)))(1−Fj(vj)) . This leads to the transfer function
given in Lemma 2.5. The details on how to calculate ti(vi, vj) are provided in the Appendix.
We have shown that there exists a transfer function such that no player gets a negative
utility if the good is not provided. Next, we determine conditions under which this function
also satisfies the property that no player pays more than her valuation if the good is provided.
If both hold, there exists a transfer function such that the allocation rule is PostIR.
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Lemma 2.6. If the derivatives are ∂ti(vi,vj)∂vi ≥ 0 and
∂ti(vi,vj)
∂vj
≤ 0, no player pays more than
her valuation if the good is provided.
Using that ti(vi, vj) is decreasing in vj we know that ti(vi, vj) is maximized at v∗j (vi) for
a given vi. Then it is sufficient to prove that ti(vi, v∗j ) ≤ vi. A similar argument applies for
tj(vi, vj).
As a last step we show a sufficient condition on the distribution Fi(vi) such that the transfer
function is monotone in both players’ types.




Note that the transfer function ti(vi, vj) also satisfies condition MON if both hazard rates
are monotone. This implies Proposition 2.7.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper addresses a classical problem in Economics; the provision of public goods. Even
though without commitment no first-best solution can be achieved, we show that there exists
a simple game that can implement the same allocation rules as any mechanism in which
players voluntary participate at all stages. This implies that a designer does not need to
resort to complicated games to implement an outcome because the voluntary contribution
game with communication can do the same job. Although players would like to free ride
on the contribution of others, they have an incentive to reveal information about their own
valuation to ensure that the good is provided at all.
Furthermore, we show that in a voluntary contribution game cheap talk can implement the
same allocation rules as a mediator. For example, when several states negotiate to create a
common financial fund to bail out banks, this constitutes a situation in which players have to
decide on the provision of a public good and such a negotiation might resemble a voluntary
contribution game with communication. Our analysis implies that having a mediator in such
negotiations yields no advantage over direct communication.
Unfortunately, the class of Veto-IC mechanisms has not yet received sufficient attention
in Economic Theory. Let us stress again that an ex post individual rationality constraint
implies that a player has no regret ex post. To illustrate situations in which players voluntary
participate in a mechanism at all stages and where they have the possibility to drop out,
mechanism design should analyze Veto-IC mechanisms. Although ex post individually rational
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and Veto-IC mechanisms are often cumbersome, in some settings they might be crucial to find
intuitive indirect mechanisms and to apply mechanism design to the real world.
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2.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Let r be an equilibrium outcome of the communication game with mediated commu-
nication.
(i) We show that r satisfies PostIR. Take two bids b′i = vi and b
′′
i > vi. If E[z(b
′′
i , b−i)] >




b−i = vi +
∑
b−i < c and b′′i +
∑
b−i ≥ c with
c = xi(b
′′
i , b−i) +
∑
x−i(b′′i , b−i). Combining this equality with the first inequality leads to
xi(b
′′




x−i(b′′i , b−i). By the rules of the game no player has to pay more




x−i(b′′i , b−i) ≥ 0





If (a)E[z(b′i, b−i)] = E[z(b
′′
i , b−i)] = 0 or if (b)E[z(b
′
i, b−i)] = E[z(b
′′









i . In (a) the public good is never pro-
vided and xi = 0 for all b−i. Given the cost sharing rule of the game xi(b′′i , b−i) ≥ xi(b′i, b−i)





i . Thus, in equilibrium no player pays more than her valuation, xi ≤ vi for all v−i, and
r is PostIR.
(ii) The game satisfies ExpostBB by construction;
∑
xi = c if the good is provided and∑
xi = 0 otherwise.
(iii) We show that r satisfies Veto-IC. Suppose vi sends mi 6= vi. Denote bˆi the bid the me-
diator recommends to player i. Let b˜−i(mi, bˆi) be the distribution over the mediator’s recom-
mendations to the other players given mi and bˆi. Let b˜i(mi) be the distribution over a player’s
own recommended bid given her message mi. Let uˆi(vi, bi,mi, bˆi) = E[ui(vi, bi, b˜−i(mi, bˆi))]
be the expected utility of player i if she bids bi given her message mi and the recommendation
bˆi.
Since the allocation rule r is an outcome of the game with a mediator, it has to hold that







vi, bi,mi, b˜i (mi)
)]
≤ Ui (vi, vi) . (2.8)
After any announcement and recommended action the player can choose how much to bid.
Denote the optimal bid with β. Assume player i chooses b′i = min{bˆi, vi}. This means he
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where the second inequality follows from ui(vi,min{vi, bˆi(mi, v−i)}, b−i)≥ max{0, ui(vi, bˆi, b−i)}















≤ Ui (vi, vi) .
Let B˜−i(mi) be the distribution over the other players’ recommendations given player i sends
message mi.





























vi, Z˜ (mi) , X˜ (mi)
)}]
(2.10)
= U∗i (mi, vi)
In line 2.10 we write the player’s utility pii in terms of the allocation rule if she sends message
mi. This is equivalent to the players utility ui in the game (line 2.9) because the player follows
the recommended bid after sending message mi. By PostIR U∗i (vi, vi) = Ui(vi, vi) and thus,
r satisfies Veto-IC.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. First, we show how to create a jointly controlled lottery and afterwards we prove the
proposition.
At the communication stage every player sends one yi. Take two announcements yi and yj
and create a new variable y˜ ∈ [0, 1], where
y˜ =

yi + yj if yi + yj ≤ 1
yi + yj − 1 if yi + yj > 1
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The new variable y˜ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] if at least one of the variables yi and
yj is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Assume that yi is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that
yj ∈ [0, 1]. For x ∈ [0, 1]
Pr [y˜ ≤ x | yj ] = Pr [(yi + yj ≤ x) ∪ (1 < yi + yj ≤ 1 + x) | yj ]
= Pr [(yi ≤ x− yj) ∪ (1− yj < yi ≤ 1 + x− yj) | yj ]
= x
independent of yj . This implies that Pr[y˜ ≤ x] = x and that Pr[y˜ ≤ x | yj ≤ z] = x.
Using the inverse transformation method for a one dimensional variable we can create a
new random variable with any distribution out of a uniformly distributed random variable.
The inverse transformation method works as follows: If a random variable x is distributed
according to some F and y is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], then the random variable F−1(y)
is also distributed according to F . Note that the inverse transformation method is defined for
one dimensional random variables.
Since each player announces one yi, we can create several random variables which are all
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] by always combining announcement yi and yi+1 to get y˜i. Next,
we need to show that these y˜i are independent. Take, e.g., y˜1 which is constructed by y1 and
y2 and y˜2 which is constructed by y2 and y3. Assume that y1 and y3 are uniformly distributed
on [0, 1] and y2 ∈ [0, 1].
Pr [(y˜1 ≤ x) ∩ (y˜2 ≤ z) | y2] = Pr [y˜1 ≤ x|y˜2 ≤ z, y2]Pr [y˜2 ≤ z | y2]
= Pr [(y1 ≤ x− y2) ∪ (1− y2 < y1 ≤ 1 + x− y2) | y˜2 ≤ z, y2]
Pr [y˜2 ≤ z | y2]
= xPr [y˜2 ≤ z | y2]
= Pr [y˜1 ≤ x | y2]Pr [y˜2 ≤ z | y2] .
Now we show that we can construct a new N−1 dimensional variable with any distribution
G(a1, a2, ..., aN−1) using N−1 uniformly distributed variables. Take the marginal distribution
of a1, Ga1(a1), and use one of the random variables y˜1 to create with the inverse transforma-
tion method a new random variable with distribution Ga1(a1). Given the realization of this
first random variable we have determined a1. Given a1, there is a conditional distribution
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Ga|a1(a2, ..., aN−1|a1) which we denote by Gˆ(a2, ..., aN−1). With a second random variable y˜2
we can create another random variable which has the same distribution as the marginal dis-
tribution of a2, Gˆa2(a2). Given the realization of a1 and a2 we can determine the conditional
distribution and the marginal distribution of a3 and so on. We always take one y˜i and with
the inverse transformation method we create a random variable with the same distribution as
the marginal distribution of one dimension of the multidimensional random variable. In this
way we can create a N − 1 dimensional variable with any distribution.
Take any allocation rule r that is Veto-IC, PostIR and ExpostBB. Now we construct an
equilibrium of the unmediated communication game with outcome r. We show hat there exist
an equilibrium in which (i) all players reveal their true type, (ii) send a yi which is uniformly
distributed and (iii) the players implement the same allocations as in r by bidding bi = xi in
the bidding stage. To prove that this in indeed an equilibrium we check that no player has
an incentive to deviate.
(i) We have defined an allocation rule r as a mapping V N → ∆({0, 1}×RN ). The allocation
rule r is PostIR and therefore we can restrict the transfers to xi ∈ [−Nc, c] if the good is
provided and to xi = 0 otherwise. We know that r is ex post budget balanced, which means
that the transfers sum up to costs c if the good is provided and to 0 otherwise. Thus, if we
know the transfers of N − 1 players, the realization of z ∈ {0, 1} and the transfer of player N
are pinned down as well. We haven shown before that we can construct a random variable with
any distribution in RN−1 by N−1 uniformly distributed variables. If r is non degenerated, the
realization of the random variable determines which allocation is implemented. The allocation
is implemented by every player bidding bi = xi. Since r always implements an equilibrium
of the stage game under complete information, no player can profit from deviation after
everybody revealed her true type.
(ii) During the communication phase, no player has an incentive to change his announce-
ment yi, because the distribution of every y˜i being uniformly distributed on [0, 1] cannot be
influenced by unilateral deviation and thus, the distribution of the jointly controlled lottery
can neither be influenced by unilateral deviation. The distribution of the jointly controlled
lottery is chosen such that for every v each allocation has the same probability in the lottery
as in the allocation rule r.
(iii) It is left to show that players are willing to reveal their true type, mi = vi. After
33
announcing mi 6= vi, the best player i can do is to bid 0 for all mi, v−i and outcomes of the
jointly controlled lottery for which no public good is provided in equilibrium. For all cases in
which the public good is provided in equilibrium, the player bids either as being typemi or less.
Since in the equilibrium of the stage game with complete information the bids exactly add up
to the costs,
∑
bi = c, the good is not provided as soon as player i bids less than a player of type
mi would bid. Thus, her expected utility of announcingmi is E[max{0, viz(β˜i(mi), β˜−i(mi))−
xi(β˜i(mi), β˜−i(mi))}] where β˜i(mi) is the distribution of a player’s bid if she is type mi and
β˜−i(mi) is the distribution of the other players’ bids if player i announces mi. Since the
allocation rule r is Veto-IC and Exp IR, it is incentive compatible for a player to reveal her
type truthfully to a mechanism given the allocation rule r and given that she can drop out
and ensure a utility of zero. This implies that E[max{0, pii(vi, Z˜(mi), X˜(mi))}] ≤ U(vi, vi).
Therefore, it is also incentive compatible for every player to reveal her type truthfully at the
cheap talk stage before the voluntary contribution game.
Example 2
The payoffs in the game are such that player i is not willing to reveal being type B using
cheap talk because the other player j will use this information against i if j is type A. This
loss is larger for i than the possible gain from revealing to be type B if j is also type B. The

















Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Define p∗(mi, vi) as the probability that the good is provided if player i sends message
mi and can reject the allocation. Define analogously t∗i (mi, vi) as the expected transfer. To
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simplify notation define p(mi, v−i) ≡ p(m), ti(mi, v−i) ≡ ti(m) and drop the index i for vi
and mi. Define a function
D(vˆ, v′,m) ≡ p∗(m, vˆ)v′ − t∗i (m, vˆ)− U(v′, v′).
D(vˆ, v′,m) determines how much a player of type v′ gains from sending message m and
behaving as if she were vˆ. We are interested in D(vˆ, v′,m) for values v′ in the interval [vˆ,m].
Lemma 2.8. If D(vˆ, vˆ,m) > 0, D(vˆ, v′,m) > D(vˆ, vˆ,m) for all v′ > vˆ.
Proof. First, we show that D(vˆ, vˆ,m) > 0 implies p∗(m, vˆ) > p(vˆ) and afterwards we show
that this again yields to D(vˆ, v′,m) > D(vˆ, vˆ,m) for all v′ > vˆ.
If D(vˆ, vˆ,m) > 0, it holds that p∗(m, vˆ)vˆ − t∗i (m, vˆ) − (p(vˆ)vˆ − ti(vˆ)) > 0, which can be
written as (p∗(m, vˆ)− p(vˆ))vˆ − t∗i (m, vˆ) + ti(vˆ) > 0. Define the sets Svˆ = {v−i|p(vˆ, v−i) = 1}
and Sm = {v−i|p(m, v−i) = 1} which are the sets of v−i where the good is provided if a player
announces type vˆ respectively m and cannot reject the allocation. By MON (iii) the transfers
for player i after announcing m are higher in Sm\Svˆ than in Svˆ if announces being vˆ. Further,
also for every v−i in Svˆ a player has to pay weakly more if she announces a higher type. The
proof is by contradiction. Assume p∗(m, vˆ) − p(vˆ) ≤ 0. Then it cannot be strictly better
for an agent to announce m if she is type vˆ (it cannot be that D(vˆ, vˆ,m) > 0), because the
probability that the good is provided is weakly lower and the expected transfer is weakly
higher than if the player announces her true type vˆ.
If p∗(m, vˆ) > p(vˆ), it follows that D(vˆ, v′,m) > D(vˆ, vˆ,m) for v′ > vˆ. To see this, rewrite
D(vˆ, v′,m) > D(vˆ, vˆ,m) as
p∗(m, vˆ)v′ − t∗i (m, vˆ)− U(v′, v′) > p∗(m, vˆ)vˆ − t∗i (m, vˆ)− U(vˆ, vˆ)
p∗(m, vˆ)(v′ − vˆ) > p(v′)v′ − ti(v′)− (p(vˆ)vˆ − ti(vˆ))
ti(v
′)− ti(vˆ) > p(v′)v′ − p(vˆ)vˆ − p∗(m, vˆ)(v′ − vˆ) (2.11)
From incentive compatibility v′p(v′)− ti(v′) > v′p(vˆ)− ti(vˆ) it follows that v′(p(v′)− p(vˆ)) >
ti(v
′)− ti(vˆ) which together with inequality (2.11) yields
v′(p(v′)− p(vˆ)) > p(v′)v′ − p(vˆ)vˆ − p∗(m, vˆ)(v′ − vˆ)
p∗(m, vˆ)(v′ − vˆ) > p(vˆ)(v′ − vˆ).
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This inequality is true because p∗(m, vˆ) > p(vˆ) and v′ > vˆ.
With this Lemma, we can prove the proposition. IC implies that U(v, v) ≥ U(m, v).
Assume player i sends m < v. Since r is PostIR, p(m)m − ti(m) ≥ 0 and this implies that
p(m)v − ti(m) ≥ 0 for all v−i. Thus, max{0, p(m)v − ti(m)} = p(m)v − ti(m) and Veto-IC
follows from IC.
Now we have to show that player i does not send m > v. Fix a message m. If p(m)v −
ti(m) ≥ 0 for all v−i, player i is never going to opt out. IC implies that player i prefers to
announce his true type to sending message m. However, if p(m)v−ti(m) < 0 for some v−i the
player prefers to reject some allocations and to ensure 0. Using the notation defined before
we can write
U∗(m, v) = Ev−i [max{0, vp(m)− ti(m)}]
= p∗(m, v)v − t∗i (m, v).
Note that ∀v′ ∈ [vˆ,m] : D(v′, v′,m) ≥ D(vˆ, v′,m). Suppose there ∃vˆ, vˆ < m, such that
D(vˆ, vˆ,m) > 0. By Lemma 2.8 it follows that D(m,m,m) ≥ D(vˆ,m,m) > D(vˆ, vˆ,m) >
0. However, since the allocation rule is PostIR, D(m,m,m) = p∗(m,m)m − t∗i (m,m) −
U(m,m) = 0 and this is a contradiction to D(v, v,m) > 0 at v = vˆ.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Take two allocation rules rˆ and r˜ which both satisfy Veto-IC, ExpostBB and PostIR.
We show that an allocation rule r, r(v) = λrˆ(v) + (1 − λ)r˜(v), with λ ∈ [0, 1], also satisfies
PostIR, ExpostBB and Veto-IC. Under rˆ and r˜, viz−x ≥ 0 for all v and all allocations which
are implemented with positive probability. It follows directly that also under the allocation
rule r the utility viz − x ≥ 0 for all v and all allocations with positive probability. Thus, r is
PostIR. Since rˆ and r˜ are ExpostBB, also the convex combination of both is ExpostBB. It is
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left to show that r satisfies Veto-IC.
U∗(vi, vi) =Er[max{0, viz − xi}]
=Er[viz − xi]
=λErˆ[viz − xi] + (1− λ)Er˜[viz − xi]
=λErˆ[max{0, viz − xi}] + (1− λ)Er˜[max{0, viz − xi}]
≥λErˆ[max{0, viz − xi}|mi, vi] + (1− λ)Er˜[max{0, viz − xi}|mi, vi]
≥Er[max{0, viz − xi}|mi, vi]
From line one to two and from line three to four we use that r, rˆ and r˜ are PostIR. For the
inequality in line five we use that rˆ and r˜ satisfy Veto-IC. Since U∗(vi, vi) ≥ Er[max{0, viz−
xi}|mi, vi], the allocation rule r fulfills Veto-IC.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. We can write that a mechanism is incentive compatible iff for every vi ∈ [0, vi]
Ui(vi) ≥ vipi(vˆi)− ti(vˆi)
for all vˆi ∈ [0, vi]. This means that no player has an incentive to lie about his true type. The
mechanism is interim individual rational iff Ui(vi) ≥ 0 for every vi ∈ [0, vi]. This ensures that
every player voluntary participates in the mechanism. Note that every mechanism that is ex
post individual rational is also interim individual rational, but not necessary the other way
round.
From the incentive compatibility constrain for vi and vˆi we get
vipi(vi)− ti(vi) ≥ vipi(vˆi)− ti(vˆi)
vˆipi(vˆi)− ti(vˆi) ≥ vˆipi(vi)− ti(vi).
Combining these two inequalities leads to
(vi − vˆi)pi(vˆi) ≤ Ui(vi)− Ui(vˆi) ≤ (vi − vˆi)pi(vi). (2.12)
From this inequality it follows that: if v > vˆi, it must hold that pi(vˆi) ≤ pi(vi) and this
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implies that pi(vi) is increasing. Inequality (2.12) implies furthermore that U
′
i (vi) = pi(vi) at
almost every vi and Ui(vi) = Ui(0) +
´ vi
0 pi(s)ds. It follows that Ui(vi) is increasing in vi.
















































































Remember that this equality comes from the condition for incentive compatibility. For a
mechanism to be interim individual rational the expected utility needs to be Ui(vi) ≥ 0,
which leads to the necessary condition that
∑
Ui(0) ≥ 0. Only if (2.3) and (2.4) hold,
the mechanism is incentive compatible and individual rational (necessary condition, but not
sufficient).
The next step is to show that these conditions are sufficient. Suppose the provision rule
p(v) satisfies these conditions. We must find a payment function t(v) such that the mechanism
is incentive compatible and individual rational. Instead of searching for a transfer function
that is interim IR and ex post BB we use a result by Börgers and Norman (2009). For
independent types they prove that for every ex ante budget balanced mechanism there exists
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an ex post budget balanced mechanism with the same allocation rule and the same interim
expected payments. Therefore, it is sufficient to find a transfer function that satisfies ex ante
budget balance and interim IR. By incentive compatibility and the provision rule p(v), the
expected transfer ti(vi) is pinned down up to a constant Ui(0). This is true for every player i.
Pick
∑













Ui(0) > 0, there are several solutions for
Ui(0). This determines the expected transfers ti(vi) and one possible transfer function is that
every player always pays her expected transfer independent of the valuations of the other
players, ti(vi, v−i) = ti(vi).
This proves the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
















and we know that Γ(p) =
∑
Ui(0). Thus the expression is maximized, if Ui,µmax(0) = Γ(p) for
the player with the highest welfare weight µmax, and Ui(0) = 0 for all players with µi < µmax.
If several players have µi = µmax, the sum of all these Ui,µmax(0) has to be equal to Γ(p).
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. First we define the provision function pα(v)
p(v) = 1 if
∑
qi(vi, αi) ≥ c
= 0 otherwise





qi(vi, 1)− c) p(v)f(v)dv ≥ 0. Analog to the proof of Proposition 2.5, (2.5)





















































This expression is maximized for αi = µ
max−µi
µmax and p = 1 iff
∑
qi(vi, αi) ≥ c. If Γ(pα) ≥ 0,
this is the solution to the problem.














(µmax + λ− µi)1− Fi(vi)
fi



















qi(αi)− c ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Now we have to show that there exists an λ such that Γ(pα) = 0. By assumption qi(1) =
vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) is increasing in vi for all i. Then qi(αi) is also increasing in vi for every αi between
0 and 1. This implies that pα(v) increases in vi and in v−i.18 Note that every αi = µ
max+λ−µi
µmax+λ
is weakly increasing in λ. For λ = 0, αi = µ
max−µi
µmax and Γ(p
α) < 0 by assumption (if it is
positive the argumentation of part one applies). For λ→∞, all αi → 1 and p1 is positive if∑





Now we show that Γ(pα) is monotone and continuous in λ.
∑
qi(αi) ≥ c is decreasing in
αi, so pα is also decreasing in every αi. Take two values for αi, α′ and α′′, with α′ < α′′,
while keeping the values for α−i constant. Γ(pα
′,α−i) differs from Γ(pα′′,α−i) only because
0 = pα
′′,α−i(v) < pα
′,α−i(v) = 1 for some v for which qi(α′′) +
∑
−i
qi(α) < c and hence∑
qi(1) < c. Thus, for these valuations v,
∑
qi(1) − c < 0 and because they are included in
the integral of α′ and not in the integral of α′′ anymore, Γ(pαi,α−i) is increasing in αi. And
since αi is weakly increasing in λ,Γ(pα) is increasing in λ.
18Note that pi(vi) is also increasing in vi.
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qi(αi) < c ,
∑
qi(αi) = c has at most one solution in vi for a given v−i






qi(vi, 1)− c) p(v)f(v)dvidv−i which is also continuous in α and
therefore Γ(pα) is continuous in λ.
It follows that for some λ it has to hold that Γ(pα) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Define the set S of v−i as S(w,w) =
{





. Split the integral
in Γ(p) in a first part in which the good is always provided independent of the valuation of
player i, given the valuations v−i, and a second part in which the provision depends on vi.
Define v∗i (v−i) in the same way as before (as the solution in vi to
∑
qi(αi) = c) and w∗ as
w∗ = c − qi(vi, αi), which is the minimum of
∑
−i
qi(αi) such that the good is provided with








































































































Remember that αi = 0 for the player with the highest welfare weight µmaxi if Γ(p
α) ≥










qi(vi, 1) − c)f−i(v−i)dv−i + 0 and the second term cancels because (v∗i (v−i) +∑
−i
qi(vi, 1) − c) = 0. Thus Γ(pαmax) > 0 if
∑
−i
vi > c and Γ(pα
max




for all i, which implies that every player is crucial, then Γ(pαmax) = 0 independent which
player has αi = 0 in αmax. Remember that Γ(pα) is increasing in αi. This implies that if we
lower any αi to be smaller than 1, Γ(pα) < 0. Therefore Γ(p) = 0 is binding for all welfare
weights if every player is crucial.
To complete the proof note that αi = 0 for all i if all players have equal welfare weights.
However, Γ(p0) < 019 and therefore Γ(p) = 0 is binding.
19Therefore, no ex post efficient allocation rule is possible under interim IR and budget balance.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. From incentive compatibility we know that




Together with Ui(vi) = p(vi)vi − t(vi) this gives the following condition for the expected















We have shown before that in an efficient allocation rule with two players Ui (0) = 0.
Using that the allocation rule is deterministic and monotone, it follows that p(v, vj) = 1 if
vj ≥ v∗j (v).

































Proof of Lemma 2.5





v∗i (vj)fj(vj)dvj is true for the transfer function given in
the proposition.
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(1− Fi(vi))(1− Fj(v∗j (vi)))
∂v∗j (vi)
∂vi



























The derivatives of both sides are the same. For vi such that v∗j (vi) = vj the value of both
functions is the same. Thus, both expressions for the expected transfer are equivalent.
Next, we show that the transfer function is incentive compatible for player j
ˆ vi
vi=v∗i (vj)




To take the derivatives of both sides, first we calculate the derivative ∂ti(vi,vj)∂vj separately























(1− Fj(vj)) + (1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(−fj(vj))
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(1− Fi(v∗i (vj)))2(1− Fj(vj)
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(1− Fi(v∗i (vj)))2(1− Fj(vj)
+




(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))2(1− Fj(vj)
=




(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))2(1− Fj(vj)
.

















− [−g(vj) + (vj + v∗i (vj)− c)(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(1− Fj(vj))] fi(v∗i (vj))∂v∗i (vj)∂vj
(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))2(1− Fj(vj)







(1− Fj(vj))(1− Fi(v∗i (vj)))
)
=
 [g(vj)− (vj + v∗i (vj)− c)(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(1− Fj(vj))] fi(v∗i (vj))∂v∗i (vj)∂vj
(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))2(1− Fj(vj)



























Analogously to before, pick vj such that v∗i (vj) = vi and the value of l.h.s and the r.h.s
of (2.13) is the same. It follows that the transfer functions in the proposition are incentive
compatible.
Idea how to find the transfer function in Proposition 2.5
1. Take the derivative of
ˆ vj
vj=v∗j (vi)




with respect to vi. Substitute vi = v∗i (vj) and solve for γ(vj).




































3. Take the derivative of
ˆ vi
vi=v∗i (vj)




with respect to vj . Plug in γ(vj) and γ′(vj). This gives the differential equation








































i (vj))(vj + v
∗






j (t))dt is a solution. Plug φ(v
∗
i (vj)) and φ
′(v∗i (vj)) into γ(vj), this







i (vj)− g(vj)(1−Fi(v∗i (vj)))(1−Fj(vj)) .
Proof of Lemma 2.6












(1− Fi(vi))(1− Fj(v∗j (vi)))2
∂v∗j (vi)
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≤ 0, the derivative of ti(vi, vj) w.r.t. vi, ∂ti(vi,vj)∂vi ≥ 0, is positive if and only
if g(v∗j (vi)) ≥ 0. Furthermore, the derivative of ti(vi, vj) w.r.t. vj is negative,∂ti(vi,vj)∂vj ≤ 0,
if and only if [−g(vj) + (vj + v∗i (vj)− c)(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(1− Fj(vj)) ]≥ 0. For a given vi, the
transfer ti is decreasing in vj . Thus, the transfer is maximized for vj = v∗j (vi) in which case
it is ti(vi, v∗j (vi)) = vi −
g(v∗j (vi))
(1−Fi(vi))(1−Fj(v∗j (vi))) ≤ vi, because g(v
∗
j (vi)) ≥ 0. The transfer
of player j, for a given valuation vj , is maximized if vi = v∗i (vj). This is tj(v
∗
i (vj), vj) =





Proof of Lemma 2.7
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 2.6 we use that (i) ∂ti(vi,vj)∂vi ≥ 0 if and only if g(v∗j (vi)) ≥ 0 and
(ii) ∂ti(vi,vj)∂vj ≤ 0 if and only if −g(vj) + (vj +v∗i (vj)− c)(1−Fi(v∗i (vj))(1−Fj(vj)) ≥ 0. In the
following part, we show a sufficient condition on the distribution Fi(vi) such that (i) and (ii)
hold. We derive the sufficient conditions for g(v∗j (vi)) ≥ 0 and at the end we show that for
−g(vj) + (vj + v∗i (vj)− c)(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(1− Fj(vj)) ≥ 0 we can use a symmetric argument.
The proof has three steps: first, in Lemma 18, we show that g(v∗j (vi)) and g(vj) are weakly
positive and second, in Lemma 19, we show that for intermediate vi, g(v∗j (vi)) is also weakly
positive if its derivative
∂g(v∗j (vi))
∂vi




is first positive and then negative if the hazard rates are monotone. This proves
that g(v∗j (vi)) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.9. g(v∗j (vi)) = 0 and g(vj) =
∑
Ui(0) ≥ 0.
Proof. It follows from the definition of g(vj) =
´ vj
v=v∗j (vi)































Compare this to the following expression that we have derived for incentive compatible





















[(vi − c)fi(vi)fj(vj)− (1− Fi(vi))fj(vj)


































By individual rationality we know that this has to be positive. Expression (2.14) is equal to
(2.15) and thus, g(vj) ≥ 0.







switches sign only once.
Proof. Remember that g(v∗j (vi)) is weakly positive at both endpoints v
∗































switches sign only once if the hazard rates are monotone and the
allocation rule is efficient, e.g. has the form
p(v) = 1 if
∑(


















j (vi)− c)fi(vi)− (1− Fi(vi))
]
It is equal to 0, if
(vi + v
∗
j (vi)− c)fi(vi)− (1− Fi(vi)) = 0




If vi = vi, the l.h.s is positive because (vi+v∗j (vi)−c) ≥ 0. The l.h.s is negative if vi = v∗i (vj),
because vj−αj 1−Fj(vj)fj(vj) +v∗i (vj)−αi
1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
= c, which is vj+v∗i (vj)−αi 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) = c and leads







the expression (vi + v∗j (vi)− c)− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) can be written as αj
1−Fj(v∗j (vi))
fj(v∗j (vi))


























which is always positive if 1−Fj(vj)fj(vj) is decreasing in vj and
1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
is decreasing in vi. In this
case (vi + v∗j (vi)− c)− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) is monotone in vi and
∂g(v∗j (vi))
∂vi
switches sign only once.
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It is left to show that [−g(vj) + (vj + v∗i (vj)− c)(1− Fi(v∗i (vj))(1− Fj(vj))] is weakly pos-
itive. We can write











[(1− Fi (v∗i (vj)))(v∗i (vj) + vj − c)(−fj(vj)
+ (v∗i (vj) + vj − c)(1− Fj(vj))(−fi (v∗i (vj)))
∂v∗i (vj)
∂vj














(1− Fi (v∗i (vj))) [(v∗i (vj) + vj − c)fj(vj)− (1− Fj(vj))] dvj (2.16)
The argument to show (15) is positive if the hazard rates are monotone is analogous to the
argument before for g(v∗j (vi)) ≥ 0 because we can write







j (vi)− c)fi(vi)− (1− Fi(vi))
]
dvi




Bayesian Persuasion with Private Ex-
perimentation1
3.1 Introduction
This paper studies a situation in which an agent tries to persuade a principal by providing
experimental evidence. Having a similar motivation Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show how
an agent optimally tries to persuade a Bayesian principal if he can design a hard (i.e., non-
manipulable) signal where the realization is publicly observable. Often, however, information
acquisition occurs in private. In this paper the agent may privately run as many experiments
as desired and selectively reveal as many results as he wants. We assume that an experimental
outcome is hard evidence, that the agent designs the precision of each experiment contingent
on the experimentation history and that his decision to continue searching also depends on
the experimentation history.
Our first contribution is to compare the persuasion probability in the sender preferred
equilibrium under private and public experimentation. If under private experimentation the
agent could use the same signal structure for persuasion as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
then he would excessively search for favorable evidence if experimentation costs are not too
high. Continuing the search can be profitable even if the agent observes unfavorable outcomes,
as there is a chance that future experiments yield persuasive evidence. Naturally, he would not
reveal any unfavorable outcomes. Excessive private experimentation and selective information
revelation dilutes the value of revealed evidence such that one outcome that is generated with
an experiment that has the same structure as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) may not
1This chapter is joint work with Mike Felgenhauer.
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be persuasive. However, there are equilibria that yield the same persuasion probability as
in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), but in these equilibria the agent has to run multiple
experiments for persuasion. This suggests a trade-off: If the agent cares sufficiently about a
favorable decision, then he might be willing to obtain a higher persuasion probability at the
expense of running several costly experiments.
Yet, this is not the case. In the sender preferred equilibrium the agent runs just one
experiment on the equilibrium path. To counteract the incentive for excessive private ex-
perimentation the agent designs this experiment with a sufficiently high precision. If the
outcome now is unfavorable, then it is too unlikely to find favorable evidence to justify the
costs of further experimentation. A sufficiently high precision of the acquired signal deters
excessive private experimentation, but it lowers the persuasion probability. This equilibrium
has a surprisingly simple structure. The precision of the single experiment is such that it
yields a positive outcome with certainty in the state in which the principal prefers the same
decision as the agent. In the state in which their preferences differ, the precision is such that
it just does not pay for the agent to continue experimentation if he knows this state. In the
sender preferred equilibrium the agent does not run multiple experiments in order to obtain
a higher persuasion probability, even if he cares substantially about a favorable decision. The
persuasion probability in the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation is
lower than under public experimentation.
We analyze the players’ payoffs in the sender preferred equilibrium further. The agent
does not benefit from the option to experiment privately. He runs a single experiment as
under public experimentation, but the persuasion probability is lower. The principal, on
the other hand, enjoys an advantage from the agent’s commitment problem. As the high
precision of the revealed evidence in the sender preferred equilibrium is not diluted by further
private experimentation, the principal obtains higher quality information than under public
experimentation.
We finally show that the higher the agent’s stakes, the better is the decision quality from
the principal’s perspective. The reason is that the more the agent cares about a favorable
decision, the higher the precision of the unique experiment has to be in order to deter further
experimentation in case of an adverse outcome. A higher signal precision improves the decision
quality.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Sec-
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tion 3.3 contains a description of the model. In section 3.4 we briefly revise Kamenica and
Gentzkow’s (2011) equilibrium analysis under public experimentation. Section 3.5 contains
our equilibrium analysis of private experimentation. In this section we also compare our re-
sults to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and provide a comparative statics analysis. Section
3.6 concludes. Omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Literature
Our paper is related to the literature on persuasion (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982, Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986, Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001, 2004, 2006), the literature on strategic experimen-
tation (e.g., Rothschild, 1974, Aghion et al., 1991, Bolton and Harris, 1999, Keller et al., 2005
and Rosenberg et al., 2007)2 and the literature that combines both strands (e.g., Henry, 2009,
Brocas and Carrillo, 2007, Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2012, 2014, Felgenhauer and Schulte,
2013, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).
Henry (2009) and Brocas and Carrillo (2007) investigate private experimentation in settings
where the principal knows or can deduce the number of experiments that the agent runs. Their
models allow for an unraveling argument a la Milgrom and Roberts (1986). However, given
that experimentation occurs in private and is sequential, we think that it is more natural that
the decision to continue experimenting is history dependent and unobservable.3 Sceptical
beliefs a la Milgrom and Roberts are, in general, not helpful in such a setting: The principal,
in general, cannot deduce the number of experiments that the agent ran, she only knows
the equilibrium experimentation plan. Nevertheless, in our paper it turns out that the agent
in the sender preferred equilibrium runs a single experiment and, hence, this experiment is
basically public.
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) use the same setup as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
but in contrast to their previous paper they assume that experimentation is costly. They show
that the concavification approach of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) extends to settings where
the costs of a signal are proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. Gentzkow and
Kamenica (2012) study competition between several agents who try to persuade a principal.
They find that the equilibrium outcomes are identical regardless of whether the principal
2For a survey see Bergemann and Valimaki (2008).
3For example, if the agent finds too many unfavorable results in the first experiments, then he knows that he
cannot persuade the principal by conducting the remaining experiments. As experimentation is private, he
cannot be forced to continue costly experimentation until the ex ante determined number of experiments
is conducted.
56 CHAPTER 3. BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
observes the signal or whether the agent sends a message to the principal and, therefore, can
decide to be vague about his signal.
Felgenhauer and Schulte (2013) also consider a situation in which an agent tries to persuade
a principal by providing experimental evidence stemming from sequential private experimen-
tation. They characterize the set of equilibria and show that as the agent’s stakes increase
sufficiently, then he has to provide more positive outcomes for persuasion in any equilibrium
with persuasion. The key difference to the present paper is that there the precision of the ex-
periments is exogenous and that the agent there prefers equilibria in which he just persuades
the principal.4 In contrast to Felgenhauer and Schulte (2013), our major contribution is to
compare the properties (like the persuasion probability, the players’ payoffs and the decision
quality) of the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation (with endogenous
precision) and under public experimentation a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Preferences
A principal chooses x ∈ {0, 1}. Her payoff depends on an unknown state of the world
s ∈ {0, 1}, with prob{s = 1} = 12 . The principal’s utility is
s = 1 s = 0
x = 1 1 1− pd
x = 0 pd 1
with pd ∈ (12 , 1). The principal, thus, would like to match the decision x with the state
of the world s if she knew s. At the optimum she only chooses x = 1 if her posterior belief
passes the “threshold of doubt” pd, i.e., the posterior that s = 1 must be weakly greater than
pd.
There is an agent who prefers x = 1 regardless of s. His prior belief is also prob{s = 1} = 12 .
His gross utility is U if x = 1 and 0 otherwise. Experimentation costs have to be subtracted
4In the sender preferred equilibrium in Felgenhauer and Schulte (2013) the number of favorable outcomes
required for persuasion is such that the principal’s threshold of doubt is just passed. Here instead, the
agent provides evidence with a high precision which stems from a single experiment and, thus, the princi-
pal’s posterior is above the threshold of doubt. As a consequence, in the sender preferred equilibrium in
Felgenhauer and Schulte (2013) the principal is just persuaded upon the provision of persuasive evidence
regardless of the agent’s stakes, whereas here, the endogenous precision implies that the quality of the




The agent has access to an experimentation technology that can generate signals about s.
He can run as many experiments as desired. yt ∈ {0, 1} is the outcome of the tth experiment.
We call yt = 1 a positive outcome and yt = 0 an adverse outcome (of experiment t). The agent
chooses the precision of an experiment t, i.e., prob{yt = 1 | s = 1} = p1t and prob{yt = 0 |
s = 0} = p0t , pit ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {0, 1}. The signals from experiments are, therefore, conditionally
independent. Define pt ≡ (p1t , p0t ). Let p1t ≥ 1 − p0t , i.e., a positive outcome yt = 1 is more
likely if s = 1 than if s = 0. Denote with ht = {(yi, pi)}i=1,...,t the experimentation history
after the first t experiments. For simplicity, we assume that running an experiment costs
c ≥ 0 regardless of the precision.5 The choice of pt is history dependent. The decision to
continue running experiments or to stop searching is also history dependent.
The agent cannot manipulate or make up experimental outcomes, i.e., yt is “hard” infor-
mation. He can reveal any subset of the acquired outcomes to the principal. Denote the
reported results by m = {(yi, pi)}i=1,...,K , where yi is the outcome of some experiment i that
is revealed to the principal (where i does not refer to the time index t).6 K is the finite
number of outcomes contained in the message. The principal observes message m but she
cannot observe the experimentation history. The agent cannot prove that he did not conduct
a particular experiment.
3.3.3 Timing
First, there is an experimentation phase, which we model as a time interval. At each point
of time within this phase the agent may conduct an experiment. This implies that if he runs
an experiment, then he may still conduct as many experiments as desired before the phase
ends. Therewith, we exclude the possibility of inferring information from the length of the
experimentation phase.7 After the experimentation phase the agent sends message m and
5With increasing costs standard arguments apply.
6The principal observes the precision of an experiment, once the outcome of this experiment is presented.
This assumption is natural in many applications. E.g., if a theoretical argument is considered as evidence,
then a scientific audience, e.g., referees, editors or seminar participants, can assess its quality.
7Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011) study in a different context the case where the decision maker can deduce
something from the time elapsed until he receives information. A longer period may, e.g., suggest many
failed experiments or that the agent ran a complex experiment. Our model abstracts from these issues.
Often experiments differ regarding the time they require until completed and it is difficult to deduce
information from the time elapsed.
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then the principal chooses x.
3.3.4 Strategies and equilibrium concept
The agent’s strategy consists of an experimentation plan and an announcement plan. For
each experimentation history the experimentation plan specifies whether to continue or to
stop experimenting and which precision to use. The announcement plan states what to reveal
to the principal after stopping. A strategy for the principal is to choose x ∈ {0, 1} for each
possible announcement.
The equilibrium concept we use is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Due to the power
of off the equilibrium path beliefs there are many equilibria. For example, the principal may
have beliefs that force the agent to provide high quality evidence by believing that the agent
privately ran sufficiently many high quality experiments with unfavorable outcomes if other
(relatively) low quality evidence is presented. In order to limit the power of off the equilibrium
path beliefs, we focus on sender preferred equilibrium. An equilibrium is sender preferred if
there is no other equilibrium in which the agent is strictly better off. This refinement makes our
results easily comparable to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) who also study sender preferred
equilibria.
3.4 Persuasion a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
Kamenica and Gentzkow assume that the agent runs a single public experiment. In order
to maximize the persuasion probability he chooses (p11, p01) = (1,
2pd−1
pd
).8 The intuition for
p11 = 1 is that the agent does not want to get an adverse outcome if s = 1. He also wants to
get a positive outcome when the state is bad, but he has to choose p01 such that he can still
persuade the principal. Therefore, he maximizes prob{y1 = 1 | s = 0} subject to prob{s =
1 | y1 = 1} ≥ pd. The persuasion probability is maximal if prob{s = 1 | y1 = 1} = pd,
i.e., such that the principal is indifferent between x = 1 and x = 0 upon the observation of
a positive outcome, yielding p01 =
2pd−1
pd






) does not depend on the agent’s stakes U/c.
8Kamenica and Gentzkow assume c = 0. If experimentation is costly, then starting experimentation is
profitable if U/c ≥ 2pd. Otherwise, experimentation is too costly.
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3.5 Private experimentation
Each equilibrium is characterized by the set of messagesM∗ which can persuade the princi-
pal. This set results from what the principal believes about the experiments which the agent
does not reveal to her. An equilibrium with information provision has to satisfy the following
two conditions. First, the agent has to have an incentive to start experimentation. Second,
the principal is persuaded if his posterior that s = 1 given the provided evidence passes the
threshold of doubt, i.e., prob{s = 1 | m∗} ≥ pd has to be satisfied, where m∗ ∈ M∗ denotes
a message that persuades the principal in equilibrium. Otherwise, she chooses x = 0. We
assume that the principal’s beliefs are such that the agent can always persuade the principal
if he provides at least one positive outcome with precision p0i = 1. A message m
∗ containing
such an outcome implies prob{s = 1 | m∗} = 1.
In contrast to public experimentation, prob{s = 1 | m∗} and, hence, whether the announce-
ment can persuade the principal depends on U/c. In general, persuasion in equilibrium re-
quires that the agent sometimes stops experimenting unsuccessfully. Otherwise, any message
that does not reveal a state with certainty is uninformative with respect to s.
Remark 3.1. Consider U/c ∈ [0, pd1−pd ]. The agent’s behavior in the sender preferred equi-
librium under private experimentation on the equilibrium path is the same as under public
experimentation.
If U/c is too small, i.e., U/c ∈ [0, 2pd), then there is no equilibrium with persuasion under
both schemes. The probability to obtain U is not high enough for the agent to justify the
costs of running an experiment. If U/c ∈ [2pd, pd1−pd ], then there is an equilibrium in which
the agent on the equilibrium path runs a single experiment and this experiment has the same
precision as under public experimentation and the principal is persuaded if the agent presents
a corresponding positive outcome. It follows that for U/c ∈ [0, pd1−pd ], the decision quality, the
persuasion probability, etc. are the same under public and private experimentation. In the
following we focus on U/c > pd1−pd .
Remark 3.2. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . There is no equilibrium where the agent on the equilibrium
path runs one experiment with precision (p11, p01) = (1,
2pd−1
pd
), i.e., the same precision as of
the experiment under public experimentation, and no further experiments.
In order to verify the remark, suppose instead that there is such an equilibrium. If y1 = 0,
the agent knows that s = 0. It is worthwhile to continue experimenting, given that the
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principal can be persuaded with one positive outcome from an experiment with precision
(1, 2pd−1pd ), if U/c >
1
(1−p01)
= pd1−pd . In this case upon the provision of a positive outcome, the
probability that s = 1 must be below the threshold of doubt pd, since the positive outcome
can stem from many experiments. Consequently, this cannot be an equilibrium if U/c is
sufficiently high.
If U/c is sufficiently high, i.e., U/c > pd1−pd , then there is no equilibrium in which the agent
runs a single experiment that leads to the maximum persuasion probability as under public
experimentation. The agent in equilibrium, however, may run multiple experiments and may
reveal more than one outcome.
We now describe equilibria that yield the same persuasion probability as under public
experimentation, but where the agent runs more than one experiment. Consider U/c ∈
[2pd + 2N,
pd
1−pd + 2N ] with N ≥ 1.9 There exists a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with the following properties. The principal is persuaded if the agent presents a positive
outcome from an experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1pd ), i.e., the same precision as under public
experimentation, and in additionN positive outcomes, where the latter stem from experiments
that are uninformative regarding s. The number of positive outcomes from uninformative
experiments N is sufficiently low such that the agent starts searching with an experiment
with (p11, p01) = (1,
2pd−1
pd
) and sufficiently high such that he stops searching unsuccessfully if
y1 = 0. If y1 = 1, then he runs uninformative experiments until he finds the required N
further positive outcomes. As the principal knows that the agent runs only one informative
experiment and this experiment has precision (p11, p01) = (1,
2pd−1
pd
), she is just persuaded upon
the provision of the N + 1 required pieces of evidence.10
It is therefore possible to obtain the maximum persuasion probability, but the agent has
to run multiple experiments for persuasion. This suggests a trade-off between the persuasion
probability and the number of experiments from the agent’s perspective. If the agent cares
sufficiently about a favorable decision relative to the costs per experiment, then we might
conjecture that in the sender preferred equilibrium the maximum persuasion probability can
be obtained.
In the following we show that private experimentation limits the extent to which persuasion
is possible in the sender preferred equilibrium. Proposition 3.1 asserts that the agent in
9According to Remark 3.2, there is no equilibrium in which the agent runs one experiment a la Kamenica and
Gentzkow if U/c > pd
1−pd and no further experiment. Later we often refer to such parameters U/c >
pd
1−pd .
Note that for each pd ∈ ( 12 , 1), there is an N , such that 2pd + 2N > pd1−pd .
10In the appendix, in part “verification of Claim 1”, we show that the equilibrium conditions are met.
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the sender preferred equilibrium runs a single experiment with p11 = 1 (as in Kamenica
and Gentzkow, 2011), but with p01 that maximizes the persuasion probability subject to the
constraint that further experimentation after an initial adverse outcome is deterred.
Proposition 3.1. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . (i) There is an equilibrium in which the agent on




U ) and no further
experiment. (ii) The equilibrium in (i) is sender preferred.
We can now compare the persuasion probabilities and the decision quality under public and
private experimentation in the sender preferred equilibria. Our interpretation of the decision
quality is motivated by the principal’s preferences. She wants to match the state with the
decision. The principal is better off (and we say that the decision quality increases) if either
prob{x = 0 | s = 1} ↓ without changing prob{x = 1 | s = 0} or prob{x = 1 | s = 0} ↓ keeping
prob{x = 0 | s = 1} constant or both decrease.
Consider a finite U/c > pd1−pd . Under both schemes p
1
1 = 1. p11 = 1 implies that the principal
does not make the “wrong” decision x = 0 in state s = 1. Therefore, prob{x = 0 | s = 1}
is the same under public and private experimentation and in this state both schemes are
equally good for the principal. In order to deter a second experiment after y1 = 0, p01
has to be greater under private experimentation if U/c is sufficiently high. A greater p01
implies that the principal makes the wrong decision x = 1 in state s = 0 with a lower
probability. Therefore, prob{x = 1 | s = 0} is lower under private experimentation than
under public experimentation. As prob{x = 0 | s = 1} is the same under both schemes
and prob{x = 1 | s = 0} is lower under private experimentation, the decision quality is
higher under private experimentation. The same p11 under both schemes and a greater p01
under private experimentation also implies that the persuasion probability is lower if search
is private.
Consider next c = 0 (as in Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) or U → ∞. In these cases,
if there is a hypothetical equilibrium in which the agent can find with a positive probability
evidence that has the power to persuade the principal, even if the agent knows that s = 0,
then he searches for it until he finds it. But then the evidence is uninformative with respect to
the state of the world s. The principal should not be persuaded by such evidence, yielding a
contradiction to the notion of an equilibrium. However, the principal can always be persuaded
in equilibrium if the agent reveals a positive outcome of an experiment that perfectly mirrors
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the state of the world.11 In the sender preferred equilibrium the persuasion probability is
1/2 and the decision matches the state.12 It follows that the decision quality is greater under
private experimentation, but the persuasion probability is lower than under the public scheme.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3.2. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . (i) The persuasion probability in the sender pre-
ferred equilibrium under private experimentation is lower than under public experimentation.
(ii) The decision quality under private experimentation is higher.
The persuasion probability under public experimentation is 12pd . The persuasion probability
under private experimentation is U+c2U if U/c >
pd
1−pd is finite and it is 1/2 if U/c→∞. Under
both schemes the agent runs a single experiment, but the persuasion probability is higher
under public experimentation, rendering private experimentation less attractive for the agent.
The principal on the other hand benefits from the agent’s commitment problem, as prob{x =
1 | s = 0} is lower under private experimentation and prob{x = 0 | s = 1} = 0 under both
schemes.
Corollary 3.1. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . The agent strictly prefers public to private experi-
mentation in the sender preferred equilibrium. The principal strictly prefers private to public
experimentation in the sender preferred equilibrium.
Finally, we analyze what happens in the sender preferred equilibrium under private exper-
imentation when the stakes of the agent U/c change. The precision of experiment i increases
if ceteris paribus p1i ↑ or p0i ↑ or both increase. In the sender preferred equilibrium p11 = 1
irrespective of U/c. The stakes of the agent U/c exclusively affect p01. If U/c increases, then
p01 has to adjust such that the agent does not have an incentive to run a second experiment
if he observes y1 = 0, i.e., p01 has to increase.
Proposition 3.3. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . (i) The precision of the experiment that is run on
the equilibrium path increases in U/c. (ii) The persuasion probability decreases in U/c, (iii)
The decision quality increases in U/c.
The persuasion probability decreases in U/c, but the agent’s experimentation costs decrease
if c ↓ and in case he obtains his preferred decision, then his payoff increases if U ↑. The
11If p01 = 1 and y1 = 0, then the agent knows that s = 0. In this case running a further experiment i with
p0i = 1 must yield yi = 0, which does not persuade the principal and is futile.
12In the appendix, part “verification of Claim 2”, we show that in any equilibrium the maximum persuasion
probability is 1/2 if U/c→∞.
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agent’s ex ante utility in the sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation is
1
2(U − c) + 12((1− U−cU )U − c), which is equivalent to 12(U − c).
If U/c increases, then the principal makes the wrong decision in state s = 0 with a lower
probability, since p01 increases. In state s = 1 on the other hand prob{x = 0 | s = 1} = 0 for
all U/c > pd1−pd , as p
1
1 = 1 regardless of the agent’s stakes.
Corollary 3.2. Consider U/c > pd1−pd . The agent’s ex ante utility increases in U/c in the
sender preferred equilibrium under private experimentation. The principal’s ex ante utility
increases in the agent’s stakes U/c in the sender preferred equilibrium under private experi-
mentation.
If, e.g., a politician is interpreted as the principal and the agent as a lobby, then our analysis
suggests, that the quality of informational lobbying and, hence, the decision quality increase
in the stakes of the lobby. A similar point can be made if a researcher with career concerns
is viewed as the agent and the principal is an editor. Young researchers aspiring tenure may
care more about a publication in a good journal than researchers with tenure. In order to get
published in the same journal, the former may have to write higher quality papers.
3.6 Discussion
There is an abundance of situations in which arguments are exchanged (e.g., in lobbying,
public discussions of economic policies, the academic publishing process, etc.). Arguments
have an inherent meaning and are not cheap talk. We think that many arguments, like logical
arguments or a regression analysis on a public database, can be viewed as hard and imperfect
decision relevant evidence.13 Furthermore, arguments often have to be acquired. In their
elegant paper Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) describe, e.g., a trial as a public experiment
yielding an argument, where a prosecutor can design the error probabilities in order to achieve
his objectives. The error probabilities can be affected, e.g., by structuring the examination of
witnesses in court.
13Once a regression method is described and the database is public, manipulation is not possible. A similar
case is made by Felgenhauer and Schulte (2013) for logical arguments. They interpret logical arguments
as decision relevant hard information that result from experimentation: If the assumptions underlying a
logical argument are revealed, then they cannot be manipulated. The deductions are logical and logic
cannot be manipulated. Logical arguments have persuasive power, therefore, they can be viewed as signals
about a decision relevant state of the world. The signals are imperfect, as the underlying assumptions do
not cover every real world aspect. A thought experiment (i.e., drawing a set of assumptions and making a
deduction) yields a signal. For such arguments the assumption that they are acquired in private by running
a series of thought experiments and selectively revealed for persuasion is natural. Such arguments have
persuasive power and, hence, they can be viewed as decision relevant. Naturally, they are also imperfect.
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While a public experiment is an interesting case for generating an argument, there are
many situations in which arguments stem from sequential private experimentation. For ex-
ample, if an agent wants to persuade with logical arguments, then he runs a series of thought
experiments. He privately chooses the properties of each experiment, e.g., by choosing the
conceptual framework from which to draw a set of specific assumptions. The outcome of each
thought experiment is privately observed. Naturally, he may run as many thought experiments
with properties of his choice (depending on what he has learnt from previous experimentation)
as desired and selectively reveal the results. If an agent wants to persuade with an empirical
analysis using a public database, then he may run a series of regressions. By choosing the
econometric method and the model specification he chooses the properties of each experiment.
Again search is sequential and the results are revealed selectively.
If arguments stem from sequential private experimentation and are selectively revealed, then
the revealed evidence should not be taken at face value. The value of such arguments depends
on the equilibrium experimentation plan, which in turn is influenced by experimentation costs
and the agent’s benefit from a favorable decision. In our paper an agent wants to persuade a
principal and we focus on sender preferred equilibria. An experimentation plan is a complex
object, since the agent in our model can make many history dependent choices. The agent
also has considerable degrees of freedom regarding the messages that he can send, as he may
reveal any subset of the acquired evidence, including “counterarguments”. We show that a
sender preferred equilibrium has a surprisingly simple structure. In equilibrium the agent
runs a single experiment. This experiment correctly predicts the state in the state where the
players prefer the same decision. In the state where the preferences differ the experiment
is such that the agent is just deterred from continuing the search. The simplicity of this
equilibrium may prove to be useful in other applications. In this equilibrium the persuasion
probability is shown to be lower than under public experimentation, since the experiment has
a higher precision.
The number of experiments that are run under public and private experimentation in the
sender preferred equilibrium are the same, but the persuasion probability under the latter
is lower. Consequently, the agent is worse off under private experimentation. The principal
benefits from the agent’s commitment problem not to run further private experiments and,
therefore, she prefers private experimentation. As an application consider a pharmaceutical
company (the agent) that attempts to persuade the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
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(the principal) to approve a newly developed drug. Given the enormous R&D costs in the
pharmaceutical industry, it is plausible that the company prefers that a new drug is approved,
even if its merits are doubtful. The FDA instead would like to make the “appropriate” decision,
which could be against the company. The FDA mainly has to rely on tests, e.g., clinical
studies, provided by the company, which in turn has an incentive to behave strategically. The
decision quality can be influenced by the rules under which evidence can be acquired and
revealed and what evidence is permitted to be considered as decision relevant. The evidence
production may be designed as public, by imposing severe penalties if this rule is violated, or
as private. Our paper suggests that, even in the sender preferred equilibrium, the FDA would
be better off under the private scheme, but the company would benefit more from public
experimentation.
We finally show that the persuasion probability decreases and the decision quality increases
in the stakes of the agent. In a context where an interested party (like a lobby, student,
researcher, etc.) tries to persuade a decision maker (like a politician, teacher, editor, etc.)
to choose a favorable action (like a policy, a better mark in the exam, the publication of a
paper, etc.) this means that the decision maker is better off the more the interested party
cares about a favorable decision. The interested party then has to provide higher quality
information in order to be able to commit not to run additional private experiments after an
initial failure. If the decision maker can influence the experimentation costs, then she benefits
from lowering costs by an analogous reasoning.
It is well established that inefficiencies occur in the presence of private information even in
the simplest economic situations (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). These inefficiencies
are often derived in mechanisms in which only cheap talk messages are feasible. In future
research it would be interesting to analyze the repercussions of an exchange of arguments on
efficiency in a mechanism design framework with transfers and multiple agents.
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3.7 Appendix
A Modified public experimentation
If the principal implements a public scheme in the sense that she can only be persuaded
with evidence obtained from public experiments, the agent nevertheless may have the option
to run experiments privately. Let us investigate a modified public scheme. Under this scheme,
the agent can run private as well as public experiments, but he can exclusively persuade the
principal with evidence obtained from public experiments. Analogous to our previous analysis
of private experimentation, there are equilibria under the modified public scheme in which
the agent has to conduct high quality public experiments in order to be able to persuade
the principal. Such an equilibrium can be supported with similar beliefs as in the private
scheme: If the principal off the equilibrium path observes low quality public experiments,
then she should think that the agent also privately collected sufficiently adverse evidence such
that it does not pay to run additional public experiments with the required quality. The
corresponding beliefs induce a decision against the agent and, therefore, destroy the agent’s
incentive to run low quality public experiments.
Consider sender preferred equilibria as in the main part of the paper. The best equilibrium
for the agent under the modified public scheme is where he runs exactly one public experiment
with the same quality as under pure public experimentation, which leads to prob{s = 1|x =
1} = pd. This equilibrium has the highest probability to persuade, and the agent incurs the
cost of running only one experiment. Thus, the agent does not run any private experiment
and the equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium under pure public experimentation. It
follows that in the sender preferred equilibrium the principal prefers the pure private scheme
to modified public experimentation and the agent prefers modified public experimentation to
the pure private scheme.
B Proofs
Proof of Remark 3.1: Consider U/c ∈ [2pd, pd1−pd ]. There is an equilibrium in which the
principal is persuaded if the agent provides a single positive outcome and this outcome stems
from an experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1pd ). In this equilibrium the agent on the equilibrium
path runs one experiment and this experiment has precision (1, 2pd−1pd ).
14 An equilibrium
14The full characterization of the equilibrium is analogous to the equilibrium described in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.1 (i).
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condition is that the agent has to start experimenting. His ex ante utility from running a






) is 12(U−c)+ 12((1− 2pd−1pd )U−c). This utility is non-negative if U/c ≥ 2pd.
A further equilibrium condition is that the agent has an incentive to stop experimenting if
y1 = 0. It is not worthwhile to continue experimenting, given that the principal can be
persuaded with one positive result of the same precision, if U/c ≤ 1
(1−p01)
= pd1−pd . The principal




and no further experiment. Hence, the decision rule is optimal as verified in the section
on public experimentation. This equilibrium is sender preferred, as the agent runs a single
experiment with the maximum persuasion probability. Consider U/c ∈ [0, 2pd). In this case
there is no equilibrium with persuasion, as it does not pay to start experimenting even if the
agent could persuade with the minimum number of experiments required for persuasion and
the maximum persuasion probability. Q.E.D.
Verification of Claim 1: Consider a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the
principal is persuaded if the agent provides N positive outcomes from uninformative ex-
periments and one positive outcome from an experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1pd ) if U/c ∈
[2pd + 2N,
pd
1−pd + 2N ] as described in the text.
15 The number of experiments to be run until
the N uninformative positive results are found follows a negative binomial distribution with
success probability 12 in state s = 1 and success probability
1
2 in state s = 0. With success
probability pi, the expected number of experiments to be conducted until N positive outcomes
are obtained is Npi . Ad interim the probability that s = 1 (and, therefore, the success proba-
bility is 12) is prob{s = 1 | ht} ≡ p. With probability 1− p the state is s = 0 (and, therefore,
the success probability is 12). Hence, the interim expected number of experiments to be run




= 2N regardless of p.
An equilibrium condition is that the agent stops unsuccessfully if y1 = 0. If y1 = 0, the
agent knows that s = 0, due to p11 = 1. The probability that he finds a positive outcome
from running a further experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1pd ) is 1−
2pd−1
pd
. If he finds a positive
15The full characterization of the equilibrium is analogous to the equilibrium described in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.1 (i) with one modification. There is a threshold posterior that can be greater than zero. The
agent continues searching after off the equilibrium path histories ht that do not contain a positive out-
come from an experiment with precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
) iff the posterior implied by ht is above the threshold
posterior. In this case the next experiment has precision (1, 2pd−1
pd
). If the outcome of this experiment is
positive, then the agent searches for the positive outcomes of the uninformative experiments until he finds
the required number for persuasion. If the outcome of this experiment is adverse, then the agent stops
searching unsuccessfully.
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outcome from such an experiment, then he would continue searching for the positive outcomes
from the uninformative experiments until he finds the required number of them, implying
expected costs 2Nc (for the uninformative experiments). Hence, his expected utility from
searching further in case y1 = 0 is (U − 2Nc)(1 − 2pd−1pd ) − c and the agent stops if this
expression is weakly below 0. This yields U/c ≤ pd1−pd + 2N .
A further equilibrium condition is that the agent starts searching. The ex ante expected
utility is 12(U − 2Nc) + 12((U − 2Nc)(1 − 2pd−1pd )) − c, which is equivalent to U−2Nc2pd − c. He
has an incentive to start experimenting if U−2Nc2pd − c ≥ 0, i.e., if U/c ≥ 2pd + 2N .
Finally, the agent has to have an incentive to continue searching until he finds the required
N+1 positive outcomes for persuasion given that y1 = 1 and he has found τ positive outcomes
from uninformative experiments, with τ ∈ [0, N). In each such a contingency his stock of
evidence that he can use for persuasion is greater than ex ante. Therefore, if the agent starts
searching, then he also continues searching in each such contingency. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: (i) Consider the following equilibrium.
Principal’s strategy: The principal chooses x = 1 iff the agent sends a message m∗ ∈ M∗,
where onem∗ ∈M∗ contains a single outcome yi = 1 with (p1i , p0i ) = (1, U−cU ) of an experiment
i (and no further outcome) and all other m∗ ∈M∗ contain at least one outcome yi = 1 with
(p1i , p
0
i ) = (p
1, 1), with some p1 ∈ (0, 1].
Experimentation plan: Given experimentation history ht the agent:
• runs a further experiment with (p1t+1, p0t+1) = (1, U−cU ) if prob{s = 1 | ht} > 0 and if ht
does not contain evidence such that sending a message m∗ ∈M∗ is feasible,
• stops searching if prob{s = 1 | ht} = 0,
• stops searching if ht contains evidence such that sending a message m∗ ∈M∗ is feasible.
Beliefs: On the equilibrium path beliefs are formed in accordance with Bayes’ Law. Off the
equilibrium path beliefs are such that upon the provision of a message m′ /∈M∗ the principal
forms a probability assessment over experimentation histories such that the probability that
s = 1 conditional on this assessment is below the threshold of doubt. E.g., he may believe
that the agent privately ran a single additional experiment i with p1i = p
0
i = 1 and yi = 0.
We now show that the above constitutes an equilibrium:
Agent behavior: The agent anticipates that he can only persuade the principal with a m∗ ∈
M∗. As the persuasion probability with precision (p1, 1), with p1 ∈ (0, 1], is (weakly) lower
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than with precision (1, U−cU ) for any ht, the agent does not run an experiment with (p
1, 1).
If ht is such that sending a message m∗ ∈ M∗ is feasible, then the agent stops searching
successfully.
If ht does not contain evidence such that a message m∗ ∈ M∗ is feasible and prob{s =
1 | ht} = 0, then he does not run a further experiment with (p1t+1, p0t+1) = (1, U−cU ) if
(1− U−cU )U − c ≤ 0, which is satisfied as the agent is indifferent to continue.
If ht does not contain evidence such that a message m∗ ∈ M∗ is feasible and prob{s = 1 |
ht} > 0, then the agent has a strict incentive to continue searching.
As the agent is indifferent to continue searching if he knows s = 0, he has a strict incentive
to start searching given his prior belief.
The agent on the equilibrium path runs a single experiment with (p11, p01) = (1,
U−c
U ) as
y1 = 1 is persuasive and y1 = 0 yields prob{s = 1 | y1} = 0.
Principal behavior: The principal knows that the agent runs a single experiment and this
experiment has precision (p11, p01) = (1,
U−c
U ). She is persuaded by the message m
∗ ∈M∗ that
contains a single experimental outcome yi = 1 with (p1i , p
0










≥ pd, which is satisfied if U/c > pd1−pd .
Any other m∗ ∈M∗ that contains at least one experimental outcome yi = 1 with (p1i , p0i ) =
(p1, 1), with some p1 ∈ (0, 1], can also persuade her as such an outcome implies that s = 1
with probability 1 (regardless of the other elements of such a message).
Beliefs given an off the equilibrium path message m′ /∈ M∗ are such that prob{s = 1 |
m′} < pd and, hence, in this case x = 0 is optimal.
(ii) Define V0(p) as the agent’s expected utility if (I) s = 0, (II) he has not yet found an
outcome that is an element of some m∗ ∈M∗, and (III) he continues experimenting according
to his equilibrium experimentation plan given that he holds the posterior prob{s = 1 | ht} = p
and given that he has not yet found an outcome that is an element of some m∗ ∈ M∗.
Analogously, define V1(p) as his expected utility given s = 1.
The agent’s utility if he has not yet found an outcome that he can use for persuasion at
posterior p is
pV1(p) + (1− p)V0(p).
We use the following two lemmas in the proof.
Lemma 3.1. An equilibrium with persuasion requires that the agent stops searching unsuc-
cessfully at some posterior p < 12 if he has not yet found an outcome that is part of some
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m∗ ∈M∗.
Proof: An equilibrium with persuasion requires that the agent stops searching unsuccess-
fully at some posterior p < 12 . If he instead in a hypothetical equilibrium only stops unsuccess-
fully if p ≥ 12 , then unsuccessful search implies that the posterior from the principal’s perspec-
tive is above 1/2. Bayesian plausibility then requires that the average posterior from the prin-
cipal’s perspective after successful search is below 1/2. The principal’s posterior may depend
on the revealed evidence but at least for somem∗ ∈M∗ we have prob{s = 1 | m∗} < 1/2 < pd.
But then the principal should not be persuaded by such a message yielding a contradiction.
The agent is better off at a posterior p if he has a stock of evidence that he can use for
persuasion than if he does not have such evidence. Hence, if the agent continues searching at
posterior p if he does not have evidence that is part of some message m∗ ∈M∗, then he also
continues searching at posterior p if he has a stock of evidence that he can use for persuasion.
Q.E.D.















2) ≥ 0 has to be satisfied, as the agent has to have an incentive to
start experimenting.
We cannot have V1(12) < 0 and V0(
1
2) ≤ 0, as this violates 12V1(12) + 12V0(12) ≥ 0. Similarly,
we cannot have V1(12) ≤ 0 and V0(12) < 0.
We cannot have V1(12) ≥ 0 and V0(12) > 0. In this case the agent could (possibly sub-
optimally) at each posterior p replicate the same behavior as at the prior where he has not
yet run an experiment, yielding V1(12) and V0(
1
2) in the respective states with this modi-





2) + (1−p)V0(12) (and both are greater than zero), the agent’s benefit from continuing to
search with the modified plan is greater than zero. With the optimal plan he is weakly better
off. Therefore, he would not stop searching unsuccessfully for any posterior given that he has
16“Replicating” behavior means the following. Consider a history ht = {(yi, pi)}i=1,...,t, where the agent has
not yet found evidence that is part of some m∗ ∈M∗ and where he faces posterior p < 1
2
. Consider further
a history ht′ = {(yi, pi)}i=1,...,t,...,t′ , with t′ ≥ t. Based on these histories construct an artificial history hz
as follows: Each (yi, pi) in hz is equal to (yt+i, pt+i) in ht′ , with i = 1, ..., z and z = t′ − t.
The agent’s experimentation plan specifies for each history ht (i) whether the agent continues or stops
experimenting and (ii) the precision of the next experiment if he continues experimenting. We say that the
agent from history ht on replicates the same behavior as at the prior where he has not yet found evidence
that can be used for persuasion, if the agent facing history ht runs the next experiment with precision p1
and at each history ht′ = {(yi, pi)}i=1,...,t,...,t′ , with t′ > t, he continues experimenting according to his
experimentation plan, as if he faces history hz instead of history ht′ .
71
not yet acquired an outcome that he can use for persuasion. Due to Lemma 3.1 this implies
that he never stops searching unsuccessfully for all posteriors p < 12 , which contradicts the
notion of an equilibrium with persuasion.
We cannot have V1(12) ≤ 0 and V0(12) > 0. In this case the agent could (possibly subopti-
mally) at each posterior p < 12 replicate the same behavior as at the prior where he has not yet
run an experiment. In this case for any p < 12 , more probability mass would be allocated to
V0(
1
2) than ex ante and less probability mass would be allocated to V1(
1








2) ≥ 0, then we have pV1(12) +(1−p)V0(12) > 0 for all p < 12 . Optimal behavior
implies a weakly greater utility. Due to Lemma 3.1 this implies that he never stops searching








2) ≥ 0 requires V1(12) ≥ 0 and V0(12) ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
Call the equilibrium in which the agent on the equilibrium path runs exactly one experiment
and this experiment has precision (p11, p01) = (1,
U−c
U ) “equilibrium SP” (where SP stands for
“sender preferred”). The agent’s ex ante utility in such an equilibrium is 12(U − c) + 12((1 −
U−c
U )U − c), which is equivalent to
1
2
(U − c). (3.1)
We show that equilibrium SP is sender preferred if U/c ∈ [ pd1−pd ,∞). In an equilibrium the
agent sends a message that contains at least n outcomes on the equilibrium path. The ex
ante expected utility is at most
1
2








because, if s = 1, then the agent gets his highest utility if he finds an outcome that can be used
for persuasion in each experiment and if he can persuade the principal after n experiments.
Note that we have V0(1/2) ≤ 0 in (3.2) due to Lemma 3.2.
We now show that the agent is strictly better off in equilibrium SP than in any other
equilibrium with persuasion.
(A) If all messages m∗ ∈M∗ that are sent on the equilibrium path contain more than one




) ≤ 0 according
to Lemma 3.2.
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(B) There can be equilibria in which on the equilibrium path also messages are sent that
contain only one outcome. For n = 1 the utility in (3.2) is weakly smaller than the utility
in (3.1). We show now that equilibrium SP is also strictly preferred by the sender to these
equilibria. We distinguish the following cases.
(a) Suppose an outcome of the first experiment that the agent runs is not an element of
some m∗ with n = 1. The agent needs to run a further experiment and V1(1/2) < (U − c).
Thus, the agent prefers equilibrium SP.
(b) Suppose y1 = 0 is an element of a message m∗ with n = 1 that is sent on the equilibrium
path, but y1 = 1 is not an element of some message m∗ with n = 1. We cannot have that the
agent on the equilibrium path runs only one experiment, as by assumption p1i ≥ 1− p0i for all
experiments i, which implies prob{s = 1 | y1 = 0} < 1/2 < pd. I.e., in such a hypothetical
equilibrium the principal should not be persuaded upon the provision of a message that
contains y1 = 0 and no other outcome. Suppose the agent on the equilibrium path runs
multiple experiments. In this case V1(1/2) < (U − c). Thus, the agent prefers equilibrium SP.
(c) Suppose y1 = 1 is an element of a message m∗ with n = 1 that is sent with positive
probability on the equilibrium path. We now derive the maximum ex ante utility of the agent
in such a potential equilibrium and properties of such a potential equilibrium. We then show
that only equilibrium SP yields this utility.
Consider a potential equilibrium in which the precision of the first experiment is such that
the principal is persuaded if the agent presents a positive outcome of this experiment. The
maximum V1(1/2) that can potentially be achieved is (U − c), since if s = 1 payoff V1(1/2) =
(U − c) implies persuasion with probability 1 with the minimum number of experiments
required for persuasion. V1(1/2) = (U − c) can be achieved in a potential equilibrium if and
only if p11 = 1. Thus, in such an equilibrium the posterior is p = 0 if the first experimental
outcome is adverse.
In such an equilibrium we cannot have that the agent continues running further experiments
if he knows that p = 0. In the hypothetical equilibrium either we have successful stopping if
y1 = 1 or the first experiment yields y1 = 0 necessarily implying p = 0. If the agent instead
continues searching if y1 = 0 knowing p = 0, then he would not stop searching unsuccessfully
in the following.17 He would, thus, run experiments until he finds some m∗ ∈ M∗ regardless
17Any following experiment does not change the posterior p = 0, but at some later experiment the agent may
have found some evidence that he can use for persuasion. Hence, the agent in the following cannot be
worse off than after y1 = 0.
73
of the state s. But then the principal should not be persuaded by such an m∗ yielding
a contradiction and, hence, the agent in equilibrium stops unsuccessfully if he knows that
p = 0.
As the agent stops searching unsuccessfully if y1 = 0 in a hypothetical equilibrium with
V1(1/2) = (U − c) the agent runs a single experiment on the equilibrium path. This deter-
mines the structure of V0(1/2) in such an equilibrium. As only one experiment is run on the
equilibrium path, we have V0(1/2) = (1 − p01)U − c. The maximum V0(1/2) that can poten-
tially be achieved in equilibrium is 0, as V0(1/2) ≤ 0 according to Lemma 3.2. Maximizing
V0(1/2) = (1 − p01)U − c with respect to p01 subject to the constraint V0(1/2) ≤ 0 yields
p01 =
U−c
U which implies that (1 − p01)U − c = 0. It follows that in the potential equilibrium
which yields V1(1/2) = (U − c), we may also achieve V0(1/2) = 0. It is, therefore, established
that p11 = 1 is the only possibility to have V1(1/2) = (U − c) and, given that p11 = 1, p01 = U−cU
is the only precision in state 0 that potentially yields V0(1/2) = 0 in equilibrium. It follows
that V1(1/2) = (U − c) and V0(1/2) = 0 can only be achieved if a single experiment is run on
the equilibrium path with (p11, p01) = (1,
U−c
U ). An equilibrium in which the agent on the equi-
librium path runs a single experiment and this experiment has precision (p11, p01) = (1,
U−c
U )
corresponds to equilibrium SP. Q.E.D.
Verification of Claim 2: In equilibrium we have prob{s = 1 | x = 1} = prob{s = 0 | x =
0} = 1: If there were an equilibrium with prob{s = 1 | x = 1} < 1, the principal would be
persuaded by some message m∗′ ∈ M∗ that exclusively contains outcomes from experiments
with p0i < 1. Then m
∗′ can be found by chance even if s = 0 and the agent would run as
many experiments as it takes to find some m∗ ∈ M∗, as U/c → ∞. He would find evidence
renderingm∗′ feasible almost with certainty regardless of s. But then this message is worthless
for the principal, contradicting that she is persuaded by m∗′. If there were an equilibrium
with prob{s = 1 | x = 1} = 1 and prob{s = 0 | x = 0} < 1, then the persuasion probability
would be smaller than 1/2. The agent could improve by running a single experiment which
perfectly mirrors the state and yields persuasion probability 1/2. Without loss of generality,
consider an equilibrium where the agent runs a single experiment on the equilibrium path
that perfectly mirrors s. In this case, the persuasion probability is strictly lower than under
public experimentation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: (i) The persuasion probability under private experimentation is
U+c





if U/c = pd1−pd . As
U+c
2U decreases in U/c, the persuasion probability
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is smaller if U/c > pd1−pd .
(ii) The decision quality is better under private experimentation, as p11 = 1 under both
schemes, but p01 is higher under private experimentation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: (i) The higher U/c, the lower the probability to find favorable
evidence conditional on s = 0 has to be in order to deter a further experiment. This is
obtained by increasing p01.
(ii) As p11 = 1 does not change and p01 increases according to (i), it follows that the persuasion
probability decreases in U/c.





Crisis and Credit Rating Agencies1
4.1 Introduction
Ratings and other quality certifications by third parties play an important role in today’s
economy. For instance, the volume of rated debt issues was over $8,000 billion in 2006.
Ratings are used by investors to guide their investment decisions. They are also crucial for
financial regulation: Basel III includes ratings as one criterion for the calculation of the capital
adequacy requirements for banks. So does the Solvency II Directive of the European Union,
passed on March 11, 2014, which harmonizes insurance regulation in the European Union and
is scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 2016.
However, ratings as a basis of regulation have been viewed controversially, especially after
the financial crisis. The major concern is that the ratings used for regulation are given by
rating agencies, which may have an incentive to distort ratings in order to maximize profit. As
a reaction to this concern, Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act (effective since 2010) requires
that all federal agencies “must remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit
ratings”.
The current article addresses the question of incentives to distort ratings by a profit max-
imizing rating agency under particular consideration of aggregate uncertainty. Aggregate
uncertainty plays a major role in many markets. As an example, for subprime mortgages the
question was not only how good the subprime mortgages were that one particular financial
institution invested in. The question was whether subprime mortgages as a whole were a
sufficiently safe investment.
To investigate the effect of aggregate uncertainty on incentives to distort, we consider a
1This chapter is joint work with Andras Niedermayer.
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model in which all other possible incentives to distort are shut down. In particular, we
consider a monopolistic rating agency that can credibly commit to a rating strategy in a
one period model. This shuts down effects such as forum shopping, reneging on the ratings
strategy, or reputational cycles.
Besides the rating agency there is a continuum of sellers selling bonds. There is a continuum
of investors seeking to buy bonds. The mass of investors is larger than the mass of sellers, so
that competition leads to prices being bid up to the expected value of a bond. The quality of
a seller’s bond is perfectly known to the seller, but unknown to investors. The rating agency
has a technology to perfectly observe the seller’s quality. Sellers can decide whether they want
to be rated. The aggregate distribution of seller’s types is initially unknown to all market
participants, except for a common prior about the distribution of the aggregate states of the
world. The states of the world differ by a different aggregate distribution of sellers’ types.
After sellers get rated, the aggregate state of the world is revealed to all market participants
and investors buy the bonds. The price depends on the expected quality in a rating class for
the realized aggregate state of the world.
We show that in accordance to the existing literature, a profit maximizing rating agency
will choose a coarse binary rating: either investment grade or junk bonds. However, in sharp
contrast to the existing literature, aggregate uncertainty leads to the cutoff not being at
the first-best level. Whether the rating agency has an incentive to be too lenient (a negative
cutoff) or too strict (a positive cutoff) is pinned down by three moments of the aggregate belief
distribution. The aggregate belief distribution is defined as follows: Take for every state of
the world the mean quality of bonds that would be bought in first-best. Market participants’
belief distribution of these means is the aggregate belief distribution. The rating agency has
more of an incentive to be too lenient if the distribution has a low mean, a high variance,
and a low higher order skewness (defined as the sum of the third and higher moments). A
low higher order skewness can be thought of as a left skewed distribution, i.e. with a high
probability bonds have a mean quality above average, but the distribution has a fat tail at the
bottom which implies that with a small probability bonds have a very low mean quality. The
opposite result holds for a larger mean, lower variance, and a larger higher order skewness.
These results can be interpreted as two opposite effects on the rating agency’s incentive to
distort ratings. One effect is pro-cyclical: they have an incentive to be too lenient before
the outbreak of a crisis (interpreting this period as a period with a large variance and left
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skewness of aggregate uncertainty) and an incentive to be too strict after the outbreak of
the crisis. The other effect is anti-cyclical: a higher mean in market beliefs about aggregate
uncertainty (likely to occur before a crisis) gives the rating agency an incentive to be too
strict and a lower mean (after a crisis) to be too lenient. While anecdotal evidence suggests
that the pro-cyclical effect is stronger,2 it is ultimately an empirical question, which effect
dominates.
This sheds light on a disturbing aspect of using credit ratings for capital adequacy regu-
lation: they may introduce pro-cyclicality into the system. Capital adequacy requirements
based on ratings may be too lenient before and too strict after the crisis. Our theory can be
seen to justify two possible policies to deal with this problem. One policy, as in Section 939A
of the Frank-Dodd Act, is to remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit
ratings from regulation. This approach has the advantage of having a clear unambiguous
rule. However, this is also viewed controversially, since it may be too costly for smaller banks
to replace external credit ratings with internal credit rating systems.3 An alternative policy
would be to use credit ratings, but take into account their cyclicality in regulation. In partic-
ular, if one believes that the pro-cyclical element dominates, capital adequacy requirements
based on ratings should include anti-cyclical elements to counterbalance pro-cyclicality.
We provide two extensions of our main result. First, we outline an empirical strategy
to determine whether the pro-cyclical or the counter-cyclical effect dominates. While an
empirical analysis is beyond of the scope of this paper, we show how the moments of the
distribution of aggregate uncertainty can be identified from the prices of financial derivatives.
Second, we extend the model to a setup with risk aversion. A model with risk aversion
explains why there are multiple rating categories and not just one (i.e. investment grade, and
possibly a second, speculative grade). The reason is that with risk aversion, investors value
more precise information about the quality of an asset to reduce risk. We provide numerical
examples to illustrate that a hybrid model of risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty preserves
the key insights about the rating agency being too lenient or too strict, but additionally
predicts multiple rating categories.
Our paper relates to a large literature on rating agencies, experts, and reputation. We
differ from all papers mentioned below by having market participants’ uncertainty about the
2In hindsight, observers of financial markets considered the ratings of agencies to have been too lenient before
and too strict after the crisis.
3See, for example, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/an-easy-fix-to-dodd-franks-credit-ratings-
rule-1063396-1.html.
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aggregate distribution of qualities as the driving force that determines the rating strategy.
If one were to remove aggregate uncertainty from our model, it would reduce to the model
in Lizzeri (1999)’s seminal contribution on certification intermediaries. Lizzeri (1999) shows
the by now well known result that certification intermediaries choose two categories (corre-
sponding to investment grade and junk bonds) and set a cutoff at 0 which is the first-best
level. (Note that this result can also be viewed as only one rating category being chosen –
investment grade – and other assets not being rated.) Lizzeri (1999)’s work has been extended
in a number of directions, including Doherty et al. (2012)’s work on risk-averse buyers. With
risk-averse buyers, it can be optimal to have more than two categories.
Two papers allow for changes in the economic environment in a dynamic model. In Bolton
et al. (2012) the rating agency trades off short term profits from consumers taking the rating
at face value and long term reputational concerns. They assume that in a boom the fraction of
naive consumers is high and, together with a low default risk, this gives the agency an incentive
to inflate ratings during booms. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) investigate the quality of ratings
when accuracy is costly for the agency. They combine reputational concerns with the change
of economic fundamentals which affect, e.g., the costs for accuracy, possible profits and the
default probability. They find that the rating quality is lower in booms than in recessions.
Our analysis is complementary to these articles, since we show that a rating agency has an
incentive to distort ratings even if all investors are rational and it is costless for the rating
agency to assess the quality of the rating. Our results rely on the joint distribution of aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
In a wider sense, our paper also relates to the literature on experts and reputation. Repu-
tation gives an incentive to report truthfully. Strausz (2005) shows that reputation leads to
monopolization and that honest certification may require a price above that of a monopolist.
Nevertheless, reputation is often not enough to ensure accurate information transmission (see
Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006; Bouvard and Levy, 2009; Mariano, 2008). Mathis et al. (2009)
show that reputation and confidence cycles may exist, because the certifier likes to build up
reputation so as to later inflate the grades and make larger profits.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model. Section 4.3 shows
that it is optimal to rate according to a simple cutoff rule and Section 4.4 derives conditions
under which this cutoff is positive or negative. Section 4.5 describes a stylized empirical
identification strategy. Section 4.6 shows that with risk-averse investors several rating classes
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can be optimal but that the effects of aggregate uncertainty on the optimal cutoff remain.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Model
There is one rating agency, a continuum of firms, and a continuum of possible investors.
Each firm sells a good of quality t, where t is a random variable with support [t, t] with
t < 0 < t. The firm has private information about the quality. Investors are risk neutral and
an investor’s gross utility from buying the good is equal to the quality t.
There are N different states of the world. The probability of the world being in state i is
i. Having a two dimensional distribution (different states of the world, different distributions
of qualities in each state of the world) adds a considerable amount of complexity. To still
have a tractable model, we impose a restriction on this two dimensional distribution. We
assume that there is a mass κi of sellers whose quality t is so low that one would never want
to rate them (we will formalize this later on). There is a mass µi of sellers whose quality t
is so high that one would always want to rate them. And then there is a mass λi of sellers
with intermediate qualities t ∈ (t, t). We allow for arbitrary distributions of κi, λi, µi (with
the only restrictions that the sum κi + λi + µi is constant and Assumption 1), but restrict
the distribution conditional on being in (t, t) to be a distribution F which is the same for all







Figure 4.1: κi and µi are the mass points at t and t in state i. λi is the mass in state i that is
allotted to the types t ∈ (t, t) with the distribution F .
Further, define the expected masses on (t, t) as µ˜ :=
∑
i iµi and on t as λ˜ :=
∑
i iλi.
Normalize λ˜ to 1. The probabilities i and the distributions of quality are known to all
players. We assume that t is sufficiently small:




0 tdF (t) + µit
κi
, ∀i = 1, ..., N
Assumption 1 makes sure that we do not have to deal with the uninteresting corner solution
in which the rating agency wants to rate all firms, including t firms.
A firm can choose to pay an upfront fee P to the rating agency in order to get rated before
the state of the world becomes known to market participants. The agency rates firms that
paid for a rating according to a precommitted rating strategy.4
The timing of moves is as follows:
• The agency sets the rating fee P and commits to a rating strategy s, s(t) = r, s : R→
R ∪ {∅}.
• Nature draws the state of the world i and quality t of each firm.
• The firms observe their own qualities, but not the state of the world, and decide whether
to go to the agency to ask for a rating or not. This decision depends on the own type
t, the strategy of the agency s and the price P .
• The agency observes the quality of the firms asking for ratings and gives ratings ac-
cording to its strategy. The ratings are publicly observable. However, investors do not
observe whether a firm went to the rating agency if the firm gets no rating (∅).
• Observing the state of the world, the buyers decide how much to bid in a second price
auction for a good. Since it is a second price auction, buyers bid their own expected
valuation which depends on their belief about the expected quality given the information
(s, P, r, i). Assuming that there are more investors than firms, investors will pay exactly
the expected quality in equilibrium.
To solve the setup for equilibria we use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We restrict the strategy
of the firms to pure strategies and look at symmetric equilibria.
The profits of the agency in one state of the world is the rating fee P times the mass of
firms asking for a rating. This mass depends on P and the rating strategy s. The agency is
risk neutral and chooses s and P to maximize expected profits before knowing the state of
the world.
The rating agency’s rating strategy s partitions the set [t, t] into M subsets, with each
4It does not matter in equilibrium whether the strategy is known at the beginning or not.
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subset m = 1, ...,M being the set of types Tm = {t|s(t) = rm} with M distinct rm.5 We will
call these subsets rating classes in the following. Since in the end only the M distinguishable
classes {Tm}Mm=1 matter and not the labels {rm}Mm=1 attached to them, the following analysis
will focus on {Tm}.
It is useful to define the expected quality in state i conditional on t being above a threshold




x tdF + µit
λi
´ t
x dF + µi
.
A firm in (t, t) attaches probability ˆi := iλi/λ˜ to being in state i. Consequently, from a (t, t)





In the following, we will assume that the virtual valuation function attached to E˜(x) is
monotone in x for x ∈ (t, t).





This assumption basically ensures that the second-order condition is fulfilled whenever the
first-order condition is fulfilled and it excludes the corner solution that it is optimal to only
rate t.
4.3 Optimality of Threshold Rating Strategy
In the following, we will show that it is optimal to rate all firms in an interval [x, t] in one
rating class and not to give a rating to all firms with t < x. Formally, s(t) = 1 for all t ≥ x
and s(t) = ∅ for all t < x.6 We will show this in four steps. First, we show that it cannot
be optimal to exclude type t. Second, we show that the price of a rating is determined by
firms with t < t. Third, given that t is included, it is optimal to have only one rating class
rather than multiple classes. Fourth, given that there is only one rating class, the set of types
5Technical speaking, there are M + 1 subsets because there can be types which do not receive any rating,
s(t) = ∅. We will show in the following of this paper that it cannot be optimal to have more than two rating
categories. Therefore, for the sake of notational simplicity, we do not consider an uncountable infinity of
rating classes. To take into account the possibility of an uncountable infinity of rating classes, e.g. full
disclosure, one could use the correspondence T (r) = {t|s(t) = r} with r ∈ R ∪ {∅} instead of the sets
{Tm}Mm=1.
6This is equivalent to s(t) = 1 for all t ≥ x and s(t) = 0 for all t < x because firms with t < x are not rated
in equilibrium.
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belonging to this class has to be convex.
Lemma 4.1. (i) It cannot be optimal that t ∈ ∪Mm=1Tm. (ii) It cannot be optimal that
t 6∈ ∪M˜m=1T˜m.
Part (i) of the Lemma holds by Assumption 1. The intuition for part (ii) of the Lemma is
that t should be included in the rating because it increases the mass of rated firms as well as,
due to its high type, other firms’ willingness to pay for a rating.
Next, we state a lemma which will be useful throughout our analysis. The lemma states
that if both firms with t ∈ (t, t) and with t = t are in the same rating class, then firms with
t ∈ (t, t) have a lower willingness to pay for a rating then firms with t = t.
Lemma 4.2. Take an arbitrary rating class T that includes firms with t ∈ (t, t) and t = t.
The willingness to pay for a rating is higher for t than for t ∈ (t, t).
The reason is that firms update ˆi differently and we show that firms with a type t assign
a higher probability to states with higher expected quality than firms with t ∈ (t, t). Lemma
4.2 can be used to prove the next lemma, which states that if there are multiple rating classes
and the highest type t is included, then it is better to merge all rating classes to one single
class.





with M˜ > 1 if t ∈ ∪M˜m=1T˜m.
Considering types that the agency intends to attract, the rating fee is always determined
by the type with the lowest willingness to pay for a rating. Merging the rating class with a
lowest willingness to pay with classes with a higher willingness to pay, the expected quality
and thus, also the minimum willingness to pay increase.
The next lemma states that all firms above a threshold are rated which means that no types
in between are excluded.
Lemma 4.4. If M = 1 and t ∈ T1, then T1 has to be convex.
If the set is not convex, there is at least one unrated hole in the middle and the agency
can rate firms in the hole instead of rating some other types below with the same mass. This
increases the expected type in every state and, therefore, also the rating fee the agency can
charge from the firms.
Lemmas 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 together lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. It is optimal to choose M = 1 with T1 = [x, t] for some x.
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Proposition 4.1 shows that the best equilibrium for the rating agency is such that the agency
offers the following ratings strategy:
s(t) =

1 if t ≥ x,
∅ otherwise,
that is, all firms above some cutoff x get a positive rating. Subsequently, all firms with
t ∈ [x, t] get rated and investors pay the expected quality over [x, t].
As usual in such models, there is a multiplicity of equilibria in the subgame following the
ratings agency’s announcement of its price P and rating strategy s. For example, there is the
trivial equilibrium in which no firm applies for a rating and investors have the off-equilibrium
belief that firms that do get a rating are of the worst possible rated quality x. Since x is less
than the price of a rating P , it is a best response for firms to stay unrated.
The usual arguments for selecting the equilibrium we described apply: The rating agency
has a first-mover advantage, hence, it is reasonable that the equilibrium most favorable to
the rating agency will be selected. Further, by a small perturbation of its strategy, the rating
agency can get rid of undesired equilibria. For example, if no firm gets a rating, the agency
might incentivize the first firms who apply for a rating in order to jump-start the market.7
4.4 Optimal Threshold
By Proposition 4.1 we can restrict our attention to threshold rules which consist of all types
above a cutoff x being pooled in one class and all types below not being rated. If there were
only one state of the world, the optimal threshold would be x = 0. To see this, take a model
with only one state of the world, e.g. by setting µi = µ˜ and λi = λ˜ = 1 for all i. Then the
agency’s profit is
Π = (1− F (x) + µ˜)
´ t
x tdF (t) + µ˜t
1− F (x) + µ˜ =
ˆ t
x
tdF (t) + µ˜t.
7A simple, albeit extreme example is the following: As long as not all firms with a quality t ∈ [x, t] enter,
firms get their rating fees refunded and get an additional small compensation. This makes sure that any
equilibrium in which not all firms in [x, t] get rated breaks down, so that the refund never has to be paid
in equilibrium.
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which is equal to welfare. The first derivative is
∂Π
∂x
= −xf(x), which is equal 0 if x = 0.
Therefore, the optimal threshold for the agency is x = 0.8 This special case of our model
corresponds to Lizzeri (1999)’s results.










=(1− F (x) + µ˜)E˜(x)
where E˜(x) is the expected value of a rating from a firm’s perspective which assigns the
probabilities ˆi to different states.














Ei(x)(λi(1− F (x)) + µi)i.




1− F (x) .




(λi(1− F (x))E0(x) + µit)i
=(1− F (x) + µ˜)Eˆ(x)
with
Eˆ(x) :=
(1− F (x))E0(x) + µ˜t
1− F (x) + µ˜ ,
which can also be written as
Eˆ(x) =
∑
i i(λi(1− F (x)) + µi)Ei(x)
1− F (x) + µ˜ .
8It is easy to check that the second-order condition is also satisfied at x = 0.
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Eˆ(x) is the expected value of a rating from a welfare perspective which takes into account
that the quantity of firms being rated (λi(1 − F (x)) + µi) is different in every state. In the
following, we will drop the argument x in Ei(x), E0(x), E˜(x), Eˆ(x) when it is unambiguous
in order to simplify notation. Eˆ and E˜ compare in the following way.
Lemma 4.5. The value of a rating is larger from a welfare then from a firm’s perspective;
Eˆ ≥ E˜ for all x.
This implies that W (x) ≥ Π(x). For non-degenerate distributions of the state of the world,
the inequality is strict and the rating agency cannot extract the whole surplus,W (x) > Π(x).9
The derivative of the profit with respect to the cutoff is
∂Π
∂x








 E˜(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal effect







and we will show later that the first order condition is sufficient for profit maximization.
Thus, the profit maximizing cutoff is given by Π′(x) = 0. Changing the cutoff has two
opposite effects on the agency’s profit; increasing the cutoff decreases the mass of firms asking
to be rated (marginal effect) but it also increases the expected quality of firms being rated
and by this it increases a firm’s willingness to pay for being rated (inframarginal effect).
We call the expression in the squared brackets in (4.1) the virtual valuation function for
E˜.10 By Assumption 2 it is monotone and, thus, the first order condition is sufficient to find
an optimum.11 This also implies that there is a unique solution of the first order condition.
We are interested in comparing the profit maximizing cutoff with the welfare maximizing
cutoff. Thus, we also have to determine the socially optimal cutoff. The derivative of welfare
9Even if ˆi = i for all i, the inequality is strict for non-degenerated distributions. Besides by the updating of
ˆi, the difference between Eˆ and E˜ is caused by the different mass of firms being rated in different states
of the world.




Ei − E′i 1−F+µ˜f
)
.
11The second order condition follows directly from Assumption 2. That we do not have a corner solution
at x = t can be seen by observing that the profit Π(x) is continuous at x = t and limx→t Π
′(x) < 0.
Assumption 1 implies that there is no corner solution at x = t (see proof of Lemma 4.1).
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 Eˆ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal effect













which is the same as for one state of the world. The derivative is 0 if x = 0 and thus, the
welfare maximizing cutoff is at 0.
































=W (x) + L(x)
where L(x) := −∑j Ej ˆj(µj−E[µ]) is the non-extractable part of the surplus (“loss” compared
to extracting total surplus). Remember that W ′(0) = 0 which implies that L′(0) = Π′(0).
Thus, the incentive for the agency to distort the rating compared to the welfare maximizing
rating is given by the sign of L′(0). The optimal cutoff is positive if L′(0) > 0 and it is
negative if L′(0) < 0.












Since the expression before the parenthesis is always positive, the sign of L′(0) and, there-
fore, the sign of the profit maximizing cutoff depends on the sign of
(








Eˆ − E˜ is positive and can be interpreted as the difference of the expected value of a rating





is that it is the
variance divided by the mean of the posterior distribution of Ei and it reflects the uncertainty
about the state of the world: if this uncertainty is sufficiently large, the cutoff is negative.
The reason for this is that firms care less about the effect of the cutoff x on the expected
quality of a rated firm if the expected quality is to a large extent driven by uncertainty about
the state of the world. Thus, the sign of L′(0) is determined by the difference of the expected
value of a rating and the ratio of variance to mean of the posterior distribution of Ei.
While the above expression for L′(0) provides some insights on the determinants of the
optimal cutoff, it is difficult to use it for comparative statics, since a change of the mean and
variance of Ei will also change Eˆ. Therefore, in the following, we will express L′(0) in terms





iλi(1− F (x))Ei − E0
t− Ei




Ei − t+ t− E0
t− Ei
= (1− F (x))
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Plugging (4.4) into the definition of Eˆ we get
Eˆ =
(1− F (x))E0 + µ˜t
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Using these derivatives one can construct a Taylor series of 1
t(1−ei) with respect to ei around










































i is the kth moment of the posterior distribution of ei. This implies that
we can write
Eˆ = t− t



















































The sign of L′(0) is given by the sign of S. Note that S only depends on the moments of ei,
more precisely, it depends only on the mean m1, the second moment m2 and the sum of all
higher moments m3+. For example, let us start with L′(0) < 0. If we keep mean and second
moment constant and increase the sum of higher moments, S increases and L′(0) can switch
sign from negative to positive. This means that we change the optimal cutoff from a negative
to a positive one by changing the higher moments of the distribution of ei.
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We can calculate the threshold m3+ for which L′(0) is 0. Set
1− 1








Observe that m3+ is always positive because m1 > m2 and m2 − m21 is the variance of ei.
This implies that for m3+ < m3+ the expression S is negative and thus L′(0) = Π′(0) < 0.
Proposition 4.3. The optimal cutoff for the rating agency is negative if m3+ < m3+ and
positive if m3+ > m3+.
We also derive thresholds for m1 and m2. First, observe that S is increasing in m1 and
decreasing in m2 given that m1,m2,m3+ > 0. Second, by setting the expression in square
brackets to zero and solving for m1 and m2, respectively, one gets thresholds for m1 and m2
that determine whether the cutoff of the rating agency is positive or negative. The thresholds
are stated in the following two Propositions.
Proposition 4.4. The optimal cutoff for the rating agency is negative if m1 < m1 and positive







4m2 + (2m2 +m3+)2
)








2m3+ + 1 + (2m1 +m3+)2 + 2m3+ + 1
)
Both thresholds, m1 and m2, are positive given that m1,m2,m3+ > 0.
Propositions 4.3, 4.4, and 4.4 have a striking implication: the rating agency has more
of an incentive to be too lenient if the distribution of aggregate uncertainty is more left
skewed (in the sense of a smaller higher order skewness or low m3+), the mean is smaller,
or the variance is larger. Left skewness and a high variance can be reasonably considered as
being associated with a period preceding the beginning of a crisis. For moments that can
be reasonably associated with a period shortly after a crisis (right skewness, low variance),
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incentive of the rating agency move in the opposite direction: the rating agency has an
increasing incentive to be too strict. This gives the rating agency an incentive to rate pro-
cyclically: excessively lenient ratings expand investments during booms, excessively restrictive
ratings restrict investments during recessions. Observe that the mean of aggregate uncertainty
has a counter cyclical effect; a small expected average, which can be associated with a period
shortly after a crisis, gives the rating agency an incentive to be too lenient. The opposite
holds for a high expected average.
4.4.1 Example of Beta Distributions
It is illustrative to parametrize the posterior distribution of Ei as a Beta distribution with
support [E0, t], i.e. Ei having a density h(y) ∝ yα−1(1−y)β−1, where y = (Ei−E0)/(t−E0).
The distribution of Ei/t is determined by the three parameters α, β, and e0 := E0/t. (The
upper bound of the support of Ei/t is 1.) These three parameters determine m1, m2, and







(α+ β)2(1 + α+ β)
+m21
m3+ =
α+ β − 1
(1− e0)(β − 1) − 1−m1 −m2
It can be shown that this is a one-to-one mapping from (α, β, e0) to (m1,m2,m3+).12 One can
use this one-to-one mapping for comparative statics with respect to say m3+ while keeping
m1 and m2 constant. Figure 4.2 shows a Beta distribution with α = 3, β = 5 and e0 = 0.1
12The mapping in the opposite direction can be derived in closed form, but the resulting expressions are rather
long and uninformative and therefore omitted. m1 andm2 are the well-known first two moments of the Beta




k] = 1 +m1 +m2 +m3+, where e = Ei/t = e0 + (1− e0)y. For a Beta distribution with density












B(α, β − 1)
B(α, β)
=
α+ β − 1
β − 1 ,





and the property Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) of the Gamma function which imply
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β − 1)(β − 1)
Γ(α+ β − 1)(α+ β − 1) =
β − 1
α+ β − 1B(α, β − 1).
Putting this together yields the expression for m3+.
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(dashed line). For this distribution, L′(0) = 0, i.e. the rating agencies sets the cutoff at
exactly the socially optimal level x = 0. For the dotted line, m1 and m2 are kept constant
and m3+ is reduced by 0.01. The dotted line has a fatter lower tail which means that it has a
higher mass at the bottom of the distribution. The mean and variance remain the same, but
if a crisis hits, it is more likely to be severe. For the dotted distribution L′(0) < 0 and hence
the cutoff is negative, x < 0, which means that the rating criteria are too loose compared to
the socially optimal ones. For the solid line, m3+ is increased by 0.01 while keeping m1 and
m2 constant. For this distribution L′(0) > 0 and hence x > 0, that is, the rating is too strict
compared to the socially optimal one.
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 illustrate the change of L′(0) as m3+, m1, and m2 are changed,
respectively, while keeping the other parameters constant. The optimal cutoff for example can
switch from a negative to a positive cutoff if the mean or the higher order skewness increase
or if the variance decreases. For all values of m1, m2, and m3+, the parameters α, β, and e0
are in permissible ranges.13







Figure 4.2: Density of Ei/t for α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (dashed line). For the dotted line, m3+ is
reduced by 0.01, for the solid line, m3+ is increased by 0.01, while m1 and m2 are kept
constant. (The corresponding parameters are α = 4.4322, β = 5.8781, e0 = 0.013363 for
the dotted and α = 2.23, β = 4.38985, e0 = 0.151755 for the solid distribution.)
4.5 Empirical Implications
Our model shows how the rating agency’s incentive to be too lenient or too strict depends
on the moments of aggregate uncertainty. Since these moments cannot be observed directly,
one may wonder about the empirical content of our model.
13The permissible ranges are α > 0, β > 0, and e0 ∈ (0, 1).








Figure 4.3: Values of L′(0) as m3+ is changed and m1 and m2 are kept constant. Starting point
is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375, m2 = 0.2125, and
m3+ = 0.294444) for which L′(0) = 0. Further parameters are normalized to t = 1 and
f(0) = 1.







Figure 4.4: Values of L′(0) as m1 is changed and m2 and m3+ are kept constant. Starting point
is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375, m2 = 0.2125, and
m3+ = 0.294444) for which L′(0) = 0. Further parameters are normalized to t = 1 and
f(0) = 1.









Figure 4.5: Values of L′(0) as m2 is changed and m1 and m3+ are kept constant. Starting point
is α = 3, β = 5, e0 = 0.1 (which corresponds to m1 = 0.4375, m2 = 0.2125, and
m3+ = 0.294444) for which L′(0) = 0. Further parameters are normalized to t = 1 and
f(0) = 1.
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First, it should be noted that an empirical estimate of the distribution of aggregate un-
certainty is non-trivial, especially if the main concern is about the distribution of aggregate
uncertainty shortly before a crisis. The reason is that only few crises occur, so it is difficult
to have larger amounts of data.
However, an empirical estimate of market participants’ beliefs about the distribution of
aggregate uncertainty can be obtained. We illustrate the basic idea of how to estimate these
moments in a strongly stylized setup containing the core idea of the empirical strategy.
Consider the following stylized setup. There is an index for the bonds being sold by the
firms in the market. Further, there is a market for financial derivatives based on this index.
As an example, one can think of an index on securitized assets backed by subprime mortgages.
Call options on the index can be bought in the first period of the model, before aggregate
uncertainty is realized. The options expire in the second period after aggregate uncertainty
has realized. Time is discrete and the options are European options.14 Further, aggregate
uncertainty is such that the mid-quality firms’ beliefs are the same as the general market
beliefs, formally, ˆi = i for all i.15 Suppose that the cut-off of the agency is close to 0
(x ≈ 0), so that the value of the index Ei(x) is well approximated by Ei(0).
Further, assume that there exist a call option with strike price yi = Ei for each state of the
world i. Without loss of generality, order the states of the world increasingly, i.e. Ej > Ei
if j > i. The second-period value of a call option with strike price yj in state i is Ei − yj if
Ei > yj and 0 if Ei ≤ yj . Denote the first-period price of option j with strike price yj as Oj .




i max{Ei − yj , 0} =
N∑
i=j+1
i(Ei − Ej) (4.8)
where the second equality follows from yj = Ej . (For i = N , Oj = 0.)
The next proposition shows that given a set of call options, the information on their strike
prices yj and first-period prices Oj identifies the market’s beliefs about the distribution of
aggregate uncertainty; it identifies the probability i for the expected quality Ei.
Proposition 4.5. Given strike prices and first period prices {(yj , Oj)}Nj=1, the probability
14In a discrete two-period model, it does not matter whether the option is European or American. In a
continuous time model, calculations for American options are somewhat more complex, but standard and
well known in the literature.
15A sufficient condition is that λi = λ˜ for all i, that is, aggregate uncertainty enters through changes of κi
and µi for different states of the world i.
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mass function of the distribution of aggregate uncertainty is given by
j =
Oj −Oj+1
yj+1 − yj −
Oj−1 −Oj
yj − yj−1
for 1 < j < N and
N =
ON−1





A similar result can be obtained for a continuous distribution of Ei. For the continuous
distribution version, drop the index in Ei and denote the distribution of E as G. Assume that
prices O(y) for call options with a continuum of strike prices y ∈ [t, t] are observed. Then












(−1)dG(c)− [(y − y)g(y)] = −(1−G(y)),
and the second
O′′(y) = g(y).
This is analogous to the discrete distribution result and the distributionG is non-parametrically
identifiable given data on call option prices.
In practice, one expects to observe less options than there are states of the world, so
parametric assumptions are required to be able to estimate the distribution of E.
In the following, we make the parametric assumption that the distribution G is a polynomial
with lower bound of support E0 and upper bound t. As an example, consider a cubic function
















Suppose we observe data for five call options with strike prices {yj}5j=1 and option prices
{O(yj)}5j=1. In this case, the parameters {ai}4i=0 are given by the linear equation system






j , j = 1, ..., 5. (4.9)





is non-singular, the equation system (4.9) yields a
unique solution for the variables {ai}4i=0. Note that E0 and t are uniquely pinned down by
the parameters {ai}4i=0 and by the equations G(E0) = 0 and G(t) = 0.16
Given the distribution G of E, we can obtain the distribution of e = E/t and the moments
m1, m2, m3+ of e. This in turn yields
S = 1− 1
1 +m1 +m2 +m3+
− m2
m1
from expression (4.7) and determines the sign of the marginal profit Π′(0) at x = 0. Table 4.1
provides examples of observed prices of call options and corresponding estimated parameters,
moments, and S. For the first set of observations (first line), the rating agency has an incentive
to choose the cutoff at the first best level x = 0. For the second line and third line, the agency
has an incentive to choose a negative and a positive cutoff, respectively.
observed prices estimated parameters moments S
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 a1 a2 a3 a4 m1 m2 m3+
11 8.0 5.7 3.9 2.6 -0.37 0.0096 -0.000030 3.4×10−8 0.35 0.15 0.30 0.0
5.9 4.1 2.7 1.8 1.1 0.0 0.0077 -0.000026 3.4×10−8 0.24 0.095 0.12 -0.073
14 10 7.2 4.9 3.2 -0.89 0.014 -0.000043 5.1×10−8 0.41 0.20 0.37 0.019
Table 4.1: Example of parameter estimates for data on call option prices Oj = O(yj) for strike prices
(y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (80, 90, 100, 110, 120).
We have illustrated the basic idea behind an empirical strategy to estimate the moments of
16While the G(E) has multiple roots due to G being a polynomial, the solution of G(E0) = 0 is unique
nonetheless. This is because of the constraints G′(E) > 0 for E ∈ [E0, t] and yj ∈ [E0, t] for all j. By the
same reasoning, there is a unique solution of G(t) = 1.
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aggregate uncertainty. To practically apply this strategy, several additional steps are required,
which are beyond the scope of this article. First, one needs to construct synthetic call options
for the index of the bonds being rated. Second, the pricing of options in a multi-period
environment is more complicated than the simple two-period setup we used for illustrative
purposes. These problems are far from trivial, but well studied in Finance, see e.g. Hull
(2009). Additionally, one could use a different parametrization for G instead of the polynomial
parametrization or, if sufficiently many observations are available, one could possibly even use
a non-parametric estimate of the function O(y) given the observations {yj , O(yj)}j . Further,
one would also want to estimate the confidence interval for S.
4.6 Risk-aversion
In the main part of this paper we have assumed that investors are risk neutral and we have
shown that it is optimal for the agency to pool all types above a cutoff in one rating class.
Doherty et al. (2012) extend the model of Lizzeri (1999) by allowing investors to be risk-averse
and they show that, if the level of risk aversion is sufficiently high, the rating agency rates
types above a cutoff in several rating classes.
First, following the paper of Doherty et al. (2012) we provide a simplified hybrid model
incorporating risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty. We show that introducing risk aversion
in a model with several states of the world can also yield several rating classes. In this case our
previous analysis can be interpreted as determining the optimal cutoff of the lowest investment
grade rating class (e.g. BBB). Second, we provide a numerical example to show that the effects
of the moments of the expected quality distribution on the optimal cutoff have the same sign
as before even with risk aversion and several rating classes.
We provide the simplest possible setup which is rich enough to illustrate the idea. Assume
that buyers are risk-averse. Their utility of an asset is equal to t but their expected utility
depends on both the mean and the variance of the quality of the asset they buy. We include
a second mass point at t2, t2 ≥ t, with mass γi in state i. To avoid confusion denote t by t1.
See Fig. 4.6.
If buyers are risk-averse, a welfare maximizing rating strategy needs to perfectly disclose
the type of all assets with a positive value because any kind of pooling and being vague about

















Figure 4.6: κi, µi and γi are the mass points at t, t1 and t2 in state i. λi is the mass in state i that
is allotted to the types t ∈ (t, t1) with the distribution F .
rating agency.17 To analyze a general model with risk-aversion is beyond the scope of this
article. In the following, we compare two rating strategies: (i) pooling all types above a cutoff
in one rating class, which is the optimal strategy without risk-aversion, and (ii) a strategy
in which the agency only pools low types and rates high types separately. Doherty et al.
(2012) show that strategy (ii) is optimal in a model with one state of the world if the level of
risk-aversion is sufficiently high.
Analogously to the case without risk-aversion, we derive the profit of the agency if it pools
all types above a cutoff x in one class. The expected type above a cutoff x is
Qi(x) := E[t|t ≥ x]
and the variance is
σi(x) := Var[t|t ≥ x].
The buyer’s valuation for the asset of a seller in this rating class is
Qi(x)− aσi(x)
where a is a measure for risk-aversion. If a = 0, the buyers are risk-neutral and the model is
equivalent to before.
17To ensure that all firms with t ≥ 0 are willing to pay the rating fee under full disclosure, the rating fee has
to be 0.
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where γ˜ is the expected value of γ, γ˜ =
∑
i iγi.
Alternatively, the rating agency can pool t ∈ [x, t1] and rate t2 separately as shown in Fig.
4.6. If the agency rates types t2 in a separate class, these sellers are willing to pay a high
rating fee (up to t2) and therefore the rating fee is determined by sellers in the class t ∈ [x, t1].
Keeping the cutoff x constant, the mass of rated firms is the same for both strategies and
the rating fee decides which rating strategy yields higher profits. If the agency pools types
t ∈ [x, t1], the expected type in this rating class is smaller than Qi(x) but the variance is also
smaller than σi(x). Thus, it is not straight forward to see under which strategy the rating fee
can be higher.
Now, we derive sufficient conditions such that the agency prefers to rate t2 separately instead
of pooling all types above x in one rating class. Define zi := γit2 and z˜ as the expected value
of zi, z˜ :=
∑
i izi. Rewrite z˜ as z˜ = t2γ˜, which can be interpreted as the agency’s profit if it
charges a rating fee of t2 and rates only firms with type t2. Remember that Π(x) is defined
as the profit if the agency rates only t ∈ [x, t1] and pools them all in one class.
Proposition 4.6. Take an arbitrary cutoff x. For any z˜ with z˜ ≤ Π(x) there exists a T 2
such that for all t2 ≥ T 2 the rating agency is better off pooling t ∈ [x, t1] and rating t2 in a
separate class than pooling all types above x in one rating class.
Since investors are risk-averse, their expected utility buying an asset in a given rating class
decreases if the variance inside this rating class becomes larger. If the variance is sufficiently
large, investors are not willing to pay any positive price for an asset even if the expected
quality is positive. Thus, if the variance is large, the agency is better off splitting the types in
several rating classes in order to reduce the variance inside one class and to increase investors’
willingness to pay for an asset. The condition that z˜ ≤ Π(x) ensures that the agency does
not prefer to charge a rating fee of t2 and to exclude firms with t < t2 from the rating.
Risk aversion does not only have the effect of multiple rating classes becoming optimal,
but it also has an additional effect on the optimal cutoff. Increasing the cutoff reduces the
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variance in a rating class and this can give additional incentives to increase the cutoff.18
In the following we provide numerical examples in which we show that the effects of the
first, second, and higher moments are similar to our analysis without risk aversion.19 In
the numerical example we have four states of the world. We take the Generalized Pareto
distribution F (t) = 1− ((1− t)/2)3 for t ∈ (−1, 1) and fix t1 = 1. This gives us E0 = 1/4. We
fix λ = 5, t2 = 110, and νi = 0.0001 for all i. The states only differ in the weights µi at the
mass point at t1, with µ1 = 0.03, µ2 = 0.2, µ3 = 0.4, and µ4 = 0.7. Changing the moments
of the aggregate distribution, we keep the distribution inside a state constant (and therefore
also the expected type) and only vary the probabilities for the different states. There is a
one-to-one mapping from (1, 2, 3) to (m1,m2,m3+) and the fourth probability is pinned
down by 4 = 1− 1 − 2 − 3. For all values of the example, the probabilities are in [0, 1].
Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 illustrate the change of the optimal cutoff as m3+, m1 and m2 are
changed while keeping the other moments constant. The solid line is the optimal cutoff for
a = 0, the dashed line for a = 0.01 and the dotted-dashed line for a = 0.02. If investors are
risk neutral, a = 0, the agency pools all types above the cutoff in one class. For a = 0.01
and a = 0.02, investors are risk averse and the agency prefers to pool all types t ∈ [x, t1] in
one class and to rate t2 separately. Note that increasing the level of risk aversion leads to an
increase in the optimal cutoff x∗. The figures show that our results from the main part of the
paper carry over to a setup including risk-aversion: Keeping the other moments constant, a
higher mean, a lower variance, or an increase in the higher order skewness lead to an increase
in the optimal cutoff. For changes with the opposite sign, the optimal cutoff decreases.
4.7 Conclusions
We have considered the profit maximizing rating strategy of a rating agency in the face of
aggregate uncertainty. We have shown that with risk neutral investors it is still optimal for
the rating agency, as in a setup without aggregate uncertainty, to choose only one rating class
for rated firms and to not rate the remaining firms.
The model’s predictions about the cutoff for the rating class strikingly differ from the
18Doherty et al. (2012) show that the optimal cutoff can be positive even with only one state of the world if
the level of risk aversion is sufficiently high.
19In the main part of the paper the moments were defined for the distribution of the expected type in [0, t]
(scaled by t). For the sake of comparison, in the numerical examples the moments are defined for the
distribution of the expected type in [x, t1] and thus, the expected type is not influenced by changes in the
mass on t2. We deviate from our previous analysis by taking the threshold x as the lower bound of the
interval. In this way we can determine the optimal cutoff explicitly and not only its sign.
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Figure 4.7: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m3+ is changed and m1 and m2 are kept constant.
For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the dotted-dashed line
a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all types above x. For the
dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled and t2 is rated separately.
(The starting values are i = 1/4 for all i. This implies m1 = 0.47627, m2 = 0.244859
and as a starting value m3+ = 0.321538.)







Figure 4.8: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m1 is changed and m2 and m3+ are kept constant.
For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the dotted-dashed line
a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all types above x. For the
dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled and t2 is rated separately.
(The starting values are i = 1/4 for all i. This implies m2 = 0.244859, m3+ = 0.321538
and as a starting value m1 = 0.47627 .)
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Figure 4.9: Values of the optimal threshold x∗ as m2 is changed and m1 and m3+ are kept constant.
For the solid line a = 0, for the dashed line a = 0.01 and for the dotted-dashed line
a = 0.02. The rating strategy for the solid line is to pool all types above x. For the
dashed and dotted-dashed line all types in [x, t1] are pooled and t2 is rated separately.
(The starting values are i = 1/4 for all i. This implies m1 = 0.47627, m3+ = 0.321538
and as a starting value m2 = 0.244859.)
predictions of a model without aggregate uncertainty: the rating agency has more of an
incentive to be too lenient if the expected average quality is small, the variance large, and the
higher order skewness small. For larger averages, smaller variances, and larger higher order
skewness the opposite holds: the rating agency has more of an incentive to be too strict. These
results can be interpreted as ratings having either a pro-cyclical or an anti-cyclical effect. We
outline an empirical strategy to estimate the moments of aggregate uncertainty which can be
used to determine which effect dominates.
Our analysis identifies one up to now unconsidered factor that affects the rating strategy
of an agency – aggregate uncertainty – and thereby sheds further light in understanding the
behavior of rating agencies. In line with our model, one disturbing effect of using ratings
as the basis for financial regulation is that a possible pro-cyclicality of ratings leads to a
pro-cyclicality of capital adequacy requirements for banks, and hence to a pro-cyclicality of
lending. One solution is to avoid using ratings as the basis for financial regulation. Another
is to counterbalance the pro-cyclicality of ratings by adding counter-cyclicality to capital
adequacy requirements that are based on ratings.
The usual disclaimer for the policy implications holds. This article is about a thorough
analysis of the effects of aggregate uncertainty, shutting down other effects such as like rep-
utation cycles, imperfect rating technology, and competition between agencies. Further, the
implications of the theory depend on the empirical moments of the distribution of aggregate
uncertainty. Hence, an empirical analysis is needed to estimate these moments and the rel-
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ative magnitude of the different effects. Our article provides a starting point for such an
empirical analysis. This paper also serves as a word of caution: using a distribution which is
pinned down by its mean and variance (e.g. a normal distribution) for an empirical analysis
will neglect the impact of the higher order skewness. However, the skewness is crucial for the
incentive of the rating agency to distort ratings.
105
4.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. (i) Denote the class containing t as Tn. Define an alternative rating class T ∗n = {t} ∪[
0, t
]
. Observe κit+ λi
´ t
0 tdF (t) + µit is the expected quality in T
∗





by Assumption 1 this is smaller than zero. The expected quality in class Tn in state i, E[Tn,i],








, it follows directly
that E[Tn,i] < 0.








, 0] to raise the expected
quality. Including negative qualities in Tn can increase the expected type in comparison to T ∗n
but the expected type E[Tn,i] stays negative. Therefore, the willingness to pay for a rating in
category Tn is negative and the rating agency prefers not to have category Tn.
(ii) Take a rating strategy {T˜m}M˜m=1. Assume that t is not in any T˜m. Define for all rating






which is constant over all states of the world. The price is determined by the lowest willing-






t∈T˜m λidF (t). Using∑













Now take a rating strategy withM = M˜+1, Tm = T˜m form ≤ M˜ and TM = {t}. Including














Since in (4.12) the expression in square brackets is weakly greater than in (4.11) and the
expression in curly braces is strictly greater in (4.12) than in (4.11), we have Π > Π˜.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2













i iλi/λ˜ = 1 Define two sets of states of the world; i ∈ A if µiiλi > µ˜





































c = 0. (4.13)




t∈T tdF + µit
λi
´
t∈T dF + µi
=
´
t∈T tdF + µi/λit´
t∈T dF + µi/λi




. The expected quality Ei for i ∈ A is larger













































































































t ∈ (t, t), the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Label the rating class that includes t as T˜1 and the remaining rating classes as T˜−1 =





t∈T˜1 dF (t) + µi]. Denote the mass of all other classes as µ
∗ =
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t) and the
















t∈T˜−1 tdF (t)) +
´
t∈T˜1 tdF (t) + µit
λi(
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t) +
´
t∈T˜1 dF (t)) + µi












where E∗m is defined as in (4.10). Further, define the profit in case all rating classes m 6= 1











Since t∗ is a weighted average of {E˜m}M˜m=1, we have t∗ ≥ min{E˜m}M˜m=1 and therefore Πˆ ≥ Π˜.
(Note that Π, Πˆ, and Π˜ only differ in the expressions in square brackets.)
We will prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume to the contrary that separate classes
108 CHAPTER 4. CRISIS AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES























being satisfied at the same time.




t∈T˜−1 tdF (t) +
´
t∈T˜1 tdF (t)) + µit
λi(
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t) +
´




t∈T˜−1 dF (t) + E˜i(
´
t∈T˜1 λidF (t) + µi)
λi(
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t) +
´
t∈T˜1 dF (t)) + µi
.
Solving for E˜i, we get






t∈T˜1 dF (t) + µi
(Ei − t∗)



























Define two sets of states of the world; i ∈ A if Ei ≥ t∗ and i ∈ B if Ei < t∗. It holds that




t∈T˜−1 tdF (t) +
´
t∈T˜1 tdF (t)) + µi/λit
(
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t) +
´
t∈T˜1 dF (t)) + µi/λi
is increasing in µi/λi. Denote cA = min {µi/λi|i ∈ A} and cB = max {µi/λi|i ∈ B}. Note
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that cA > cB.
Then (4.16) can be rewritten as
∑
i
ˆi(Ei − t∗) < 0
which is equivalent to ∑
i∈A
ˆi(Ei − t∗) +
∑
i∈B
ˆi(Ei − t∗) < 0.
This implies[ ´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t)´




















t∈T˜1 dF (t) + cB
and the sum over i ∈ A is positive and the sum over i ∈ B is negative. Since µi/λi ≥ cA
for all i ∈ A and ∑i∈A ˆi(Ei − t∗) positive, the first expression in square brackets in (4.19) is
bounded form below by
´
t∈T˜−1 dF (t)´
t∈T˜1 dF (t) + cA
∑
i∈A























t∈T˜1 dF (t) + µi/λi
(Ei − t∗). (4.21)
because of µi/λi ≤ cB for all i ∈ B and the negativity of
∑
i∈B ˆi(Ei − t∗).















t∈T˜1 dF (t) + µi/λi
(Ei − t∗) < 0
which contradicts (4.18).
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Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof. Assume that Tˆ is not convex. Take a convex set T ′ such that it has the same expected
mass of rated firms (
´
t∈Tˆ dF (t) =
´








t∈T tdF (t) + µit
λi
´
t∈T dF (t) + µi
](ˆ
t∈T





t∈Tˆ dF (t) =
´
t∈T ′ dF (t), comparing the profits Π(Tˆ ) and Π(T
′) boils down to compar-
ing the willingness to pay for Tˆ and T ′, which is given in square brackets. Since Tˆ is not
convex, there is at least one unrated hole in the middle and it is possible to rate the mass in
the holes instead of rating some types below with the same mass. This increases
´
t∈T tdF (t),






is greater for T ′
than for Tˆ and hence Π(T ′) > Π(Tˆ ). Therefore, it is optimal to rate a set T which is convex
and includes t.
Proof of Lemma 4.5




and i ∈ B if µiλi ≤
µ˜
λ˜
. It holds that
∑
i i (µi − λiµ˜) = 0 which we can write as∑
A i (µi − λiµ˜)+
∑
B i (µi − λiµ˜) = 0. Multiplied by a constant c = 1(1−F )+µ˜ the expression
is still equal to 0. For i ∈ A, 1(1−F )+µi/λi is smaller than 1(1−F )+µ˜ and for i ∈ B it is the other
way round. It follows that
∑
A
i (µi − λiµ˜) 1
(1− F ) + µi/λi +
∑
B
i (µi − λiµ˜) 1
(1− F ) + µi/λi < 0



















(Eˆ − 1− F (x) + µ˜
f











We know that Eˆ ≥ E˜ but the sign of E˜′ − Eˆ′ can go in both directions.
Next, we rewrite (4.22) such that we can express L′(x) only in terms of Ei, E˜, and Eˆ. The











λi(1− F (x)) + µi f(x)λi.





1− F (x) + µ˜f(x).
Using these two expressions in (4.22), we can write
L′(x) =f(x)
(






λi(1− F (x)) + µiλif −
Eˆ − x









λi(1− F (x)) + µiλi − (Eˆ − x)
)
.
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Remember that W ′(0) = 0 which implies that L′(0) = Π′(0). Thus, the sign of L′(0) deter-
mines the sign of the profit maximizing cutoff. To determine the sign of L′(0) we set x = 0










































+ E˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
inframarginal effect
 .
This expression gives us another way to write the inframarginal effect of a change of the























Proof of Proposition 4.5




i(Ei − yN−1) = n(yN − yN−1).












where the first equality follows from (4.8) and the second equality can be obtained by rear-
ranging the sums. Dividing by Ej − Ej−1 yields
Oj−1 −Oj






yj+1 − yj −
Oj−1 −Oj






i = j ,
that is, the expression for j for 1 < j < N in the proposition. The expression for 1 simply
follows from that fact that probabilities add up to one.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. We want to analyze the effect of a change of t2, while keeping zi = γit2 constant. For














x tdF (t) + µit1 + γit2
λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi
)2
=
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi)(λi
´ t1
x t






x tdF (t) + µit1 + γit2)
2
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + γi)2
=
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + zi/t2)(λi
´ t1
x t
2dF (t) + µit
2
1 + zit2)− (λi
´ t1
x tdF (t) + µit1 + zi)
2
(λi(1− F (x)) + µi + zi/t2)2










x tdF (t) + µit1 + zi
λi(1− F (x)) + µi <∞.
It follows that for a > 0, the utility in state i, Qi(x)− aσi(x), becomes negative if t2 is large
enough. This implies that buyers are not willing to pay a positive price for a rated firm if the
variance of types in one rating class is too high. Thus, for every cutoff x there is a t2 large
enough such that the rating agency is better off pooling t ∈ [x, t1] and rating t2 in a separate
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class than pooling all types above x.
A further condition that needs to be satisfied is that the agency does not prefer to charge
a rating fee of t2 and to rate only firms with type t2 which yields profits of t2γ˜. Since we
keep γit2 constant when we increase t2, the profit of only rating types t2 stays constant. A
sufficient condition such that the agency prefers to rate [x, t1] and t2 is that the profit of
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